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Introduction
On November 22, 2005 the ruling coalition of Japan, the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),' released a draft proposal to
reform the Constitution.2 For the first time since Japan's second
I Despite its name, the LDP is a politically conservative party that has been in
continuous power in Japan since 1955, apart from ten months from 1993-94. A Very
Japanese Revolution, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17-23, 2005, at 12.
2 See Carl Freire, Japan's Ruling Party Unveils Draft Constitution That Beefs Up
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
constitution3 came into effect during the post-war occupation in
1947,4 revisionists finally stand a genuine chance of re-writing
"the world's oldest unrevised constitution."
5
The most significant change proposed by the LDP, and
arguably the chief purpose of the draft revision, is to remove the
war renunciation language of Article 9 of the constitution. The
Article 9 language forbids Japan from possessing any war-making
capabilities.6  Such a change would give definitive legal
justification for the self-defense armed forces that Japan has
possessed since shortly after the introduction of the post-war
constitution.7 The changes would go even further, allowing
Japan's forces to actively participate in international peacekeeping
and collective defense actions, such as the United States-led war in
Afghanistan and Iraq.8
While the LDP's proposed constitutional amendments would
lend validity to Japan's seemingly unconstitutional quasi-military
force, they would at the same time do harm to one of the
constitution's primary principles, pacifism. In addition to re-
defining the nation after WWII, pacifism also served as an
effective apology that aided Japan in its post-war relations with its
East Asian neighbors who were victimized by the Japanese army
through horrible wartime atrocities.9 Japan is showing some
troubling signs of returning to its nationalistic past, such as public
Military, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 22, 2005, available at Factiva.
3 For a fascinating discussion of Japan's first constitution, the Meiji Constitution,
which legally established the emperor's absolute sovereignty, see Sylvia Brown
Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese
Constitution and Human Rights, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 421-26 (1999).
4 James E. Auer, Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of
Armed Force "Forever" to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 176 (1990).
5 GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN'S CONTESTED CONSTITUTION 3
(2001).
6 See Editorial, Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo),
Nov. 7, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20051107al.html
(registration required to access the article).
7 See Auer, supra note 4, at 176-77.
8 See Freire, supra note 2.
9 See Hiroyuki Sakai, Opinion, Maintain the Constitution as Japan's Apology,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE (HERALD ASAHI) (Tokyo), Oct. 24, 2005, available at Factiva.
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officials paying respects at a war shrine that contains the spirits of
convicted war criminals and history textbooks that whitewash
Japan's atrocities. Given this trend, the movement away from
pacifism by removing the war renunciation language from the
Constitution of Japan will likely aggravate tensions in an already
volatile region.
I. Reforming Japan's Peace Constitution
The principle of pacifism, which has in part defined Japan's
remarkable post-war success,"° is currently enshrined in Article 9
of the Constitution of Japan, which reads:
Chapter II: Renunciation of War
Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized."
The goal of pacifism is also bolstered by the preamble of the
Constitution of Japan, which states:
We, the Japanese people[,] ... resolve[] that never again shall
we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of
government[. We] desire peace for all time and are deeply
conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and
we have determined to preserve our security and existence[,]
trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of
the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an
12international society striving for the preservation of peace ....
10 "In the course of half a century, Japan has moved from recipient of World Bank
funds to second largest shareholder." Paul Wolfowitz, Editorial, Japan, World Bank
Must Tackle Poverty Together, DAILY YOMIuRi (Tokyo), Oct. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.worldbank.org (follow "About" hyperlink, then follow "Organization"
hyperlink in menu on left side of page, then follow "Office of President" hyperlink in
menu on fight side of page, then follow "Statements" hyperlink in menu on left side of
page, then follow "Commentary" hyperlink under "Statements," follow "Japan, World
Bank.h. "yperlink).
HI KENPO, art. 9.
12 KENPO, pmbl.
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Notwithstanding these provisions, the "Peace Constitution"' 3 did
not prevent Japan from developing a quasi-military force. In fact,
Japan began building this force in 1950, only three years after the
constitution came into effect. 4 Since that time, it has grown and
developed to the extent that "Japan now has the fourth largest
military (and by some counts the third) in the world measured by
dollars spent."' 15 This apparent disconnect has led the LDP to push
for a radical revision to the Constitution of Japan which would
allow, according to one commentator, the creation of "a full-
fledged military force that..., would take part in... military
operations abroad without restraint."'' 6
In addition to actually explicitly referring to the right to a
"self-defense military," the new constitutional draft's military
would have the ability to engage in "international cooperation
activities for the purpose of securing international peace."' 7
Instead of titling the second chapter "Renunciation of War," it
would now be called "National Security."' 18 While the first section
of Article 9 has not been touched, the second section, which bans a
military force and renounces the right of belligerency, would be
deleted altogether.' 9 While at one time such changes would have
been unthinkable, 20 recent surges in nationalism, fear of Asian
neighbors, and the popularity of LDP leadership appear to have
opened the door to the real possibility of constitutional
amendment.
13 Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and the Rule of Law, 13
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 127, 129 (2005).
14 See Auer, supra note 4, at 176.
15 Port, supra note 13, at 128.
16 See Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, supra note 6.
17 Self-Defense Right Guaranteed by Draft, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE (HERALD
ASAHI) (Tokyo), Oct. 29, 2005, available at Factiva.
18 Id.
19 Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, supra note 6.
20 "The chance of passing such an amendment through the legislature is...
extremely unlikely." Robert A. Fisher, The Erosion of Japanese Pacifism: The
Constitutionality of the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
393, 427 (1999).
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A. Domestic Climate Ripe for Political Reform
Reform fever is currently sweeping Japan. In an effort to
downsize its massive government, Japan recently privatized the
national telecommunications company.2' Privatization of the
Japanese Post 22 will soon begin 23 and privatization of Japan's
government-affiliated banks could soon follow. 24 This atmosphere
for government change has led commentators to refer to it as the
"biggest round of reforms since [the] Meiji Restoration[,]" the
period where Japan began to westernize its culture at the end of
the 19th Century. 25 The demand for reform has even spilled over
to professional sports, with calls for changes in big league baseball
financing.26
One of the factors that may have led to this appetite for change
is the first positively bullish outlook 27 for the Japanese economy
after nearly fifteen years of stagnation.28 Some signs of economic
growth include the lowest level of unemployment since the late
1990s, rising wages, and property prices on the rise for the first
21 Japan's Telecom Privatization Completed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 6, 2005,
available at LEXIS.
22 Truly a monster of bureaucracy, the Japanese Post not only delivers the mail but
with three trillion dollars in Japanese household financial assets, it is currently the largest
financial institution in the world. Koizumi Gets His Way, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17-23, 2005,
at 22.
23 See Postal Bills Finally Pass the Diet, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE (HERALD ASAHI)
(Tokyo), Oct. 15, 2005, available at Factiva.
24 See Central Govt to Integrate, Privatize State Banks, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Nov. 21, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 18781893; Koizumi's Last Shuffle, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 5-11, 2005, at 45.
25 Anthony Faiola, Japan's Koizumi Wins a Landslide Mandate for Change, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 2005, at A13. The Meiji Restoration is also referred to as the Meiji
Revolution. See Hamano, supra note 3, at 419.
26 See Takenori Emoto, Editorial, It's Time for Baseball to Take a Chance on
Reform, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE (HERALD ASAHI) (Tokyo), Nov. 5, 2005, available at
Factiva.
27 See Hugh Cortazzi, Editorial, How Clear Is Japan's Future?, JAPAN TIMES
(Tokyo), Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/eo2005I024hc.html (registration required to access the article); Editorial, The Sun
Also Rises, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 14, 2005, at 8.
28 See Editorial, Rising Japan Follows Its Leader, OBSERVER (London), Sept. 18,
2005, at 4.
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time in over a decade.29 One reason for this economic upturn is
that "corporate restructuring has cut out some of the dead wood"
after years of bad times.3 ° In addition, China's exceptional growth
has proven to be a healthy market for Japanese investment.3'
Underlying social changes may have also played a part in this
push for reform. Traditionally, Japanese people have been
characterized as having "strong human relationships" and a sense
of community-driven thought. 32 An observer has noted that more
recently there has been development of a new "group of
individualistic Japanese who are not afraid ... of being alone., 33
In addition, there have been many other significant changes, such
as a considerable population decline34 and rising crime35 and
suicide rates,36 which could greatly affect how the Japanese view
themselves. It is natural that persistent social changes could lead
people to also seek changes in the mode of government that
represents them.
Some argue that former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi37 incorporated these changes into his bid to win a
29 Id.; see Average Land Values Rise for the First Time in 14 Years, ASAHI
(Tokyo), Aug. 2, 2006, available at http://www.asahi.corn/english/Herald-
asahi/TKY200608020085.html.
30 Rising Japan Follows Its Leader, supra note 28.
31 See Koizumi Gets His Way, supra note 22.
32 See Nobuo Noda, Editorial, Poll Shows Erosion of Old Values, DAILY YOMIURI
(Tokyo), Sept. 16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14618216.
33 Id.
34 See Visions of 2020, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8-14, 2005, at 16. The Japanese Ministry
of Health has suggested that the current population of 128 million could drop to 100
million by 2050. Id. "By 2030, Japan will have only two workers for every retiree and,
by mid-century, three workers for every two retirees." Meet the New Salaryman,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 12-18, 2005, at 41.
35 See Editorial, Strengthening Public Safety, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 4, 2005,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20051004a].html (registration
required to access the article). In addition to rising crime generally, the terrorist nerve
gas attacks on the Tokyo subway by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, killing 12
and sending 5,500 to the hospital, shook Japanese society to its core. See Kevin
Rafferty, Shoko Tactics, GUARDIAN (London), May 16, 1995, at T2.
36 See The Sun Also Rises, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8-14, 2005, at 6. "Suicides have
soared, up more than 50 percent since 1990 to 34,500 in 2003." Id.
37 Koizumi's self-given moniker is "Lionheart." A Very Japanese Revolution,
supra note 1. Koizumi was a new kind of prime minister for Japan, with his long hair,
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stunning snap election victory in 2005.38 Frustrated by the efforts
of a faction of the LDP, which defeated his reform bill for the
Japanese Post, Koizumi took a huge gamble by "dissolv[ing] the
lower house, call[ing] an election and refus[ing] to support the
campaigns of the [thirty-seven] lower-house LDP members who
had opposed it."39  Instead, seizing on cultural changes which
devalued close ties,40 Koizumi replaced the ousted LDP members
with "a team of high-profile candidates--dubbed 'assassins' by
Japan's media"' all the while "hammering" his mantra of postal
reform.42  His gamble paid off, winning 296 of 480 legislature
seats, the "biggest haul since 1986.,4' Term limits required
Koizumi to leave office and on September 26, 2006, Shinzo Abe,
Chief Cabinet Secretary under Koizumi, was elected Japan's
newest prime minister.44 It is undeniable that the LDP has a
"remarkable mandate to enact a new stage of reforms in the
world's second-largest economy.
Swept up in the reform fever,4 6 the LDP is finally poised to
and "penchant[] for hard rock." See Eric Talmadge, Traditional Japan PM Touts
Radical Reform, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 11, 2005, available at LEXIS. He was the
first Japanese prime minister to be a divorced father. Id. Koizumi did, however, come
with the right pedigree, with a father and grandfather who held cabinet posts in past
administrations. Id. He won the election for prime minister on a platform of reform
after twelve terms in the Japanese legislature. Id.
38 See Noda, supra note 32.
39 Koizumi Gets His Way, supra note 22. This amounted to Koizumi's risking
"15% of the LDP's pre-election strength." A Very Japanese Revolution, supra note 1.
40 See Noda, supra note 32.
41 Koizumi Gets His Way, supra note 22.
42 See The Woodpecker and the Lumberjack, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3-9, 2005, at 37.
43 Koizumi Gets His Way, supra note 22.
44 Martin Fackler, New Premier Seeks a Japan With Muscle And a Voice, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at A3.
45 Faiola, supra note 25; see Takashi Oda, Editorial, Public Expects Actions on
Reform/Koizumi, 'New LDP' Have Obligation to Respond to Huge Mandate, DAILY
YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 13, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14404637; Editorial,
Koizumi Has All the Sticks, All the Carrots, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 23, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 15019138. But see Editorial, A Mandate and a Monopoly,
GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 12, 2005, at 34 (arguing that since Koizumi's victory further
entrenches the ruling party after fifty years of power, the message is ultimately that
Japan does not want change).
46 See LDP Has Major Task in Reforming Top Law, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Mar.
22, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 4424398.
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deliver the constitutional revisions that have been a core party
platform since its inception. Indeed, it was on the 50th
anniversary of the LDP's formation that Koizumi unveiled his
administration's draft proposal for constitutional reform.48 The
release also happened to roughly coincide with another important
anniversary-the 60th anniversary of Japan's surrender in
WWII. 4 9 The surrender ended WWII and led to the creation of the
current constitution, which the LDP seeks to revise.5 °
B. Difficult International Political Climate
Anniversaries aside, a constitutional amendment could not
come at a worse time in terms of Japan's relationships with its
East Asian neighbors. 51 Indeed, a series of long-running disputes
with individual nations has been underscored by more recent
developments that many outsiders see as a frightening rise of
Japan's political right-wing, heralding the return of the
nationalism perceived to be behind Japan's atrocities during
WWII. 52 These feelings increasingly lead to distrust of and
47 Isao Sato, Revisionism During the Forty Years of the Constitution of Japan, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 97 (1990).
48 See Editorial, Constitutional Revision: The LDP Apparently Put Off Debate on
Article 9, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 2005, available at LEXIS.
49 See Justin McCurry, Koizumi Apologizes for Wartime Wrongs, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 16, 2005, at 11.
50 See Auer, supra note 4, at 172 (discussing how events in the American
occupation following Japanese surrender led to the re-writing of the first constitution).
The first constitution, known as the Meiji Constitution, was in effect for fifty years,
approximately as long as the current Showa Constitution. See John M. Maki, The
Constitution of Japan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights,
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 87 (1990).
51 Even though South Korea and Japan's relationship is certainly not the most
contentious amongst Japan's East Asian neighbors, according to a Japanese Foreign
Ministry official, the atmosphere between the two countries is currently the "worst ever."
Lee Jin-woo, S. Korea, Japan Hold Summit Today, KOREA TIMES (Seoul), June 19, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 9762625.
52 See Kwan Weng Kin, Ambivalent Japanese Split Over War Responsibility,
CHINA DAILY (Beijing), Aug. 17, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/17/content_469871.htm; Opinion, Japan Should Wake Up
To History, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), June 24, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 10138708.
One result of rising nationalism in Japan is a surge in popularity for xenophobic manga,
Japanese comic books, which depict attractive Japanese with Westernized features
saying outrageously offensive things about Koreans and Chinese, depicted as ignorant
[Vol. XXXII
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hostility towards Japan.53 Until Japan's neighbors feel more
comfortable that Japan is not returning to the military
aggressiveness of its past, they will likely be extremely wary of
any changes to the absolute pacifism advocated in Japan's current
constitution.54
1. WWII Apology
Japan unquestionably committed horrible atrocities in WW115
and it is a common sentiment in East Asia that Japan is in denial of
its war crimes.56 This sentiment persists even in the face of
repeated public apology for WWII wrongdoing from Japanese
officials.57 Many factors contribute to this opinion amongst East
Asians unsatisfied by Japan's WWII apologies.
Some see Japan's apologies themselves as insufficient or
defective in various ways.58 For example, a Chinese newspaper
and backwards with prominent Asian features. See Norimitsu Onishi, Ugly Images of
Asian Rivals Become Best Sellers in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005 at Al;
Ultranationalist Manga Gain Popularity in Japan as Regional Tensions Rise, MAINICHI
DAILY(Tokyo), Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://mdn.mainichi-
msn.co.jp/features/archive/news/2005/12/20051201p2g00m0fe022000c.html.
53 See Gavin McCormack, Rewriting an Ugly Past, AGE, Aug. 15, 2005, available
at http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/rewriting-an-ugly-past/2005/08/14/112395
7950490.html (reporting that 90 percent of South Koreans do not trust Japan); China
Restaurant Bars Unapologetic Japanese, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), July 13, 2005,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/13/content_459713.htm
(describing a restaurant in China that insists Japanese patrons apologize for Japan's
wartime aggressions before being served).
54 See Japan Should Wake Up To History, supra note 52.
55 See Gregory Clark, Editorial, Look for Change Next Year, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo),
Oct. 23, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo2005l023gc.html
(discussing notorious Unit 731's gas and germ warfare experiments on live prisoners,
slave labor, and massacres in the extremities of the Japanese Empire) (registration
required to access the article); "Comfort Women" Recall War Crimes, CHINA DAILY
(Beijing), Aug. 12, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-
08/12/content_468291.htm (describing the chilling experience of one of thousands of
young women forced into wartime sex slavery for the Japanese military).
56 See "Comfort Women" Recall War Crimes, supra note 55.
57 See McCurry, supra note 49, at 11 (for an example of a recent apology on the
60th anniversary of WWII).
58 See Japan Should Wake Up to History, supra note 52 (describing an apology as
too vaguely worded); Hu Xiao, Opinion, Tokyo Must Back Words with Action, CHINA
DAILY (Beijing), Aug. 16, 2005, available at Factiva.
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was quick to point out that a legislative draft resolution
apologizing for WWII on its 60th anniversary was a toned down
version of a similar resolution in 1995.' 9 The draft this time
removed the words "acts of aggression" and "colonial rule," and
instead apologized for "our country's actions." 6° Critics also point
to missed opportunities for Japan to make sincere and meaningful
apologies, such as during a joint declaration on history issues
between Japan and China in 1998.61
Because so much time has passed, one could argue that an
apology is no longer necessary, but the reality is that Japan's
WWII legacy remains very much alive today. In the past decade
alone, many Chinese have been killed or injured by chemical
weapons abandoned by Japan at the end of the war.62 Moreover,
Japan is faced with regular civil suits for damages suffered by East
Asians at the hands of the Japanese.63 While Japanese courts are
sometimes willing to admit guilt, damage awards are rare.6' It is
doubtful that this problem will disappear with Koizumi, since
newly elected Prime Minister Abe took the unprecedented step
prior to the election of refusing to formally endorse what had been
the government's official apology since 1995. Instead, he merely
indicated that he would "not negate the spirit" of the apology. 6
5
While Abe did eventually cave to political pressure by agreeing to
honor the official apology, his initial hesitation is nevertheless
59 WWII Draft Not to Cite "Aggression", CHINA DAILY (Beijing), July 28, 2005,
available at Factiva.
60 Id.
61 Japan Should Wake Up to History, supra note 52.
62 See Fu Jing, Japan Apology for Chemical Injuries, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), June
28, 2005, available at Factiva.
63 See Chinese Laborers Demand Tokyo's Apology, PEOPLE'S DAILY (Beijing), July
3, 2004, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200407/03/eng20040703-
148383.html; Tokyo Court Rejects Germ Warfare Appeal, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), July
20, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/20/content
461566.htm.
64 See Chinese Laborers Demand Tokyo's Apology, supra note 63; Tokyo Court
Rejects Germ Warfare Appeal, supra note 63.
65 See Abe Dodges Issue of Stance Over World War H 'Remorse', ASAHI (Tokyo),
Sept. 8, 2006, available at http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200609
080204.html.
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Another factor that mars international acceptance of Japanese
apologies for imperial aggression are informal statements by
public officials that undermine the sincerity of formal apologies.
For example, Japanese Education Minister Nariaki Nakayama
recently stated-referring to the internationally recognized
problem of sex slaves forcibly drafted into the Japanese military-
that such "comfort women" never existed.67 While this statement
prompted rapid correction by Koizumi's administration, much of
the damage had already been done in terms of international
opinion.68  Furthermore, critics point to growing popular
nationalist sentiment within Japan that also downplays Japan's war
guilt. A recent editorial in The Japan Times admits war crimes,
while at the same time claiming that "Tokyo never resorted to
anything quite as grubby as Britain's Opium War against China. 69
The war museum at the Yasukuni Shrine goes so far as to portray
Japan's part in WWII as a "heroic effort[] to liberate Asia. 70
An additional area of difficulty is the treatment of Japanese
war criminals at the Tokyo Trials following Japan's surrender.
Many within Japan view the outcome as "victor's justice[.]"'
More than one thousand Japanese Class B and C war criminals
were executed while allied forces were ignored, despite the
devastating fire bombings of Japan, not to mention two nuclear
strikes.72 However, of the more important Class A Japanese war
crime suspects and convicts, many went on to positions of great
prominence in Japan.73 For example, Okinori Kaya became justice
66 See Abe to Honor Ex-PMs' China Apologies, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Oct. 3,
2006, available at LEXIS.
67 Japan Sorry for Sex Slaves in World War 11, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), June 13,
2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/13/content_
450997.htm.
68 Id.
69 Clark, supra note 55.
70 The Ambiguity of Yasukuni, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8-14, 2005, at 15.
71 McCormack, supra note 53. Current Prime Minister Abe has thus far not
"accepted the validity of the Tokyo [T]rials[,]" unlike Koizumi. Norimitsu Onishi,
Japan's Likely Next Premier in Hawkish Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at A6.
72 Id.
73 See Editorial, Time Ripe for Review of War Responsibility, DAILY YOMIURI
(Tokyo), Aug. 15, 2005, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/
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minister,7 4 Mamoru Shigemitsu became foreign minister,75 and
Nobosuke Kishi, current Prime Minister Abe's grandfather,76 took
the highest public office in Japan, that of prime minister."
Perhaps the most effective apology for Japan's war crimes is
the war renunciation provisions in the current pacifist constitution.
Should the Constitution remain as is, Japan's neighbors can at
least feel assured that Japan will not pursue aggressive military
action due to the legal prohibition in the current Constitution.
Since many view Article 9 in this way,7 8 Japan should take extra
care in its efforts to make revisions.7 9
2. Yasukuni Shrine
Arguably the most emotionally-charged issue in Japanese-East
Asian relations in recent years was Koizumi's repeated annual
visits to the Yasukuni war shrine. Founded in 1869, Yasukuni is a
Shinto shrine which honors the spirits of the 2.5 million Japanese
war dead since 1853.80 Most troubling, however, is the inclusion
of fourteen Class A war criminals executed at the Tokyo Trials in
1948, whose spirits are inseparable from the other spirits and
cannot be excluded from worship.8' In addition, the war museum
located at the shrine treats Japan's war history as an ultimately
positive experience for East Asia. 82  The shrine's website
mi_mOWDQ/is_2005_August_22/ai-n14940850.
74 Id.
75 Editorial, Govt Must Expedite New War Memorial, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
June 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 8961522.
76 See Hiroko Nakata, Abe's Conservative Lineage Runs Deep, JAPAN TIMES
(Tokyo), Sept. 7, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn2006O9O7f2.html (registration required to access the article).
77 McCormack, supra note 53.
78 See Yu Yoshitake, Editorial, Playing the Constitution as a Diplomatic Card,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE (HERALD ASAHI) (Tokyo), May 23, 2005 (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
79 See Sakai, supra note 9.
80 The Ambiguity of Yasukuni, supra note 70.
81 Id. In 1959, Yasukuni also secretly enshrined the spirits of 353 Class B and C
war criminals. Shuichi Yutaka & Yu Miyaji, Yasukuni in Secret Deal on Enshrining
Lesser-Ranked War Criminals, ASAHI (Tokyo), Aug. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200608110131 .html.
82 See The Ambiguity of Yasukuni, supra note 70.
[Vol. XXXII
REFORMING JAPAN'S PACIFIST CONSTITUTION
announces "the truth of modem Japanese history is now
restored."83
Koizumi's insistence on remaining faithful to his campaign
promise to visit the shrine annually compounded the problem.84
Though he admitted that some of those enshrined are genuine war
criminals, he nevertheless went to worship, as have prime
ministers before him.85 Koizumi stated that his visits were "not to
beautify the history, but to pay tribute to those forced to be in the
war and swear that Japan should not bring on war again. ' 86 China
nevertheless responded by saying that Koizumi has 'swallowed"'
his apology for WWII by insisting on visits to the shrine.87
Regardless of Koizumi's statements, his shrine visits have
caused virtually nothing but uproar abroad.88 The most ardent
critic is China, which "staunchly oppose[s] ' '89 each visit, viewing it
as a "grave provocation to the Chinese people." 9° In an official
statement after Koizumi's fifth visit on October 17, 2005, the
83 Id.
84 Brad Glosserman, Editorial, A Koizumi Promise Not Worth Keeping, JAPAN
TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 26, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/eo20051026bg.html (registration required to access the article). Though their
influence may be on the decline, the LDP has long relied heavily on the support of
widows of the war-dead, referred to as "Yasukuni wives." See Kin of War-Dead Finding
Political Clout on Wane, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo) Nov. 18, 2005, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2005 111 8f4.html (registration required to access
the article).
85 See Glosserman, supra note 84.
86 Ryu Jin, Roh, Koizumi Disagree on War History, KOREA TIMES (Seoul), June 21,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 9819549.
87 See China Says Meeting with Japan and South Korea Postponed Amid Yasukuni
Shrine Tension, MAINICHI DAILY (Tokyo), Dec. 4, 2005, available at LEXIS.
88 Even the United States, one of Japan's strongest supporters, distanced itself from
Koizumi's actions, as evidenced by the State Department's repeated referral to the issue
as "region-specific." See Glosserman, supra note 84.
89 Koizumi Makes Fifth Visit to Yasukuni Shrine, ASAHI (Tokyo), Oct. 17, 2005 (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
90 Justin McCurry, Beijing Furious After Japanese PM Pays New Visit to War
Dead Shrine, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 18, 2005, at 16. In addition to direct words of
displeasure about the visit, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also personally snubbed
Koizumi by refusing to honor a request by Koizumi to borrow a pen at the East Asia
Summit. Eventually Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi intervened.
See Pen Mightier Than Sword as Chinese Leader Puts Frosty Relations With Japan on
Display, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 14, 2005, available at Factiva.
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Chinese ambassador to Japan expressed "strong indignation"
towards the Japanese prime minister's "willful injury of Chinese
feelings and dignity, and serious wrongdoings to hurt" relations
between the two countries.9' Chinese Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing even went so far recently as to liken Yasukuni to the
idea of a memorial in Germany honoring Hitler.92
Koizumi's sixth and final visit to Yasukuni was on August 15,
2006, the anniversary of Japan's surrender.93 The last time a prime
minister visited Yasukuni on August 15--described as "the most
diplomatically explosive date possible" 9 4- was in 1985. 95 Within
Japan, Koizumi's visit enjoyed overall general approval from the
public96 and, shockingly, even prompted a nationalist to burn down
the house of LDP politician Koichi Kato, a critic of Koizumi.9'
Although Koizumi's sixth visit was expected, it nevertheless
occasioned a "fresh wave of anger" from China and South Korea.98
In addition to strong words, China has also taken action
against Japan. While taking precautions to avoid violent anti-
Japan protests at home, China has been systematically "replacing
high-ranking participants in Japan-related events with lower-level
91 McCurry, supra note 90, at 16. In 2006 China's Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing
described Koizumi's Yasukuni visits as "stupid." Abe Lashes Back at China Over
Yasukuni Visit Rebuke, MAINICHI DAILY (Tokyo), Mar. 8, 2006 (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
92 China Playing the Hitler Card, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Nov. 16, 2005, available
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2005lll6a3.html (registration required to
access the article).
93 See Norimitsu Onishi, Koizumi Exits Office as He Arrived: Defiant on War
Shrine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at A6.
94 Justin McCurry, Koizumi Ignores Protests in Final Shrine Visit, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 16, 2006, at 16.
95 See Defiant Koizumi Unbowed by Memo, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 17,
2006, available at LEXIS.
96 See Over 50% Approve of Yasukuni Shrine Visit, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug.
17, 2006, available at LEXIS.
97 See Suspected Arsonist Member of Right-Wing Group, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Aug. 17, 2006, available at LEXIS. After the attack, the arsonist attempted to commit
suicide by ritual disembowelment but apparently failed. See Rightist Linked to Arson of
Kato's Home, ASAHI (Tokyo), Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://www.asahi.com/
english/Herald-asahi/TKY200608170082.html.
98 Anthony Faiola, Koizumi Visits War Shrine Despite Protests, WASH. POST, Aug.
15, 2006, at A 10.
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officials." 99 It seems likely that diplomatic relations will remain
icy for some time, considering that Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi
"abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting" in 2006 simply because
Koizumi suggested that he may visit the shrine again.'0° It appears
very unlikely that the current prime minister will satisfy China in
this regard. Although Abe, unlike Koizumi, has not pledged to
attend Yasukuni annually,' 01 he is nevertheless a self-avowed
supporter of Yasukuni visits who would 'like [them] to
continue[.]' 0 2
South Korea has also been highly disappointed by Koizumi's
repeated Yasukuni visits, expressing "deep regret and
disappointment" in response to his fifth visit.'0 3 South Korea
indicated that, in light of these circumstances, a previously
planned Japan-South Korea summit with President Roh Moo-hyun
scheduled for 2005 would be impossible without a satisfactory
Japanese response on the Yasukuni issue.' 04 In a more positive
sign, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon ultimately
decided not to cancel a trip to Japan despite threats to do so.0 5
99 China Pulls VIPs from Friendship Events, ASAHI (Tokyo), Oct. 25, 2005,
available at Factiva.
100 Naohito Maeda, Koizumi's Latest Shrine Visit Has Everyone Looking to His
Successor, ASAHI (Tokyo), Oct. 18, 2005, available at Factiva.
101 See Reiji Yoshida, Abe Looking to Beef Up Defense Posture, JAPAN TIMES
(Tokyo), Sept. 7, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20060907fl .html (registration required to access the article); Abe Dodges Issue of
Stance Over World War H 'Remorse', supra note 65.
102 Koizumi Reshuffles Cabinet/3 Possible Successors-Abe, Aso, Tanigaki-Get
Key Posts, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Nov. 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17993371.
Furthermore, Abe has suggested that he, unlike Koizumi, does not distinguish between
the war criminals and the other war dead enshrined at Yasukuni. See Reiji Yoshida, War
Criminals, War Dead Same: Abe, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Nov. 17, 2005, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20051117a3.html (registration required to access
the article).
103 Koizumi Makes Fifth Visit to Yasukuni Shrine, supra note 89.
104 See Seoul Demands Apology Over Yasukuni Before Summit, JAPAN TIMES
(Tokyo), Oct. 25, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn
20051025a3.html (registration required to access the article). After poor discussions
between Roh and Koizumi at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit,
South Korea formally ruled out a previously scheduled visit to Japan in December of
2005. Hayami Ichikawa, Seoul: Don't Expect Roh to Visit Japan This Year, ASAHI
(Tokyo), Nov. 29, 2005, available at LexisNexis Academic.
105 See China Pulls VIPs from Friendship Events, supra note 99.
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Criticism for Koizumi's Yasukuni shrine visits has not only
come from foreign leaders but also from within Japan. While
polls show that a slight majority of Japanese support Koizumi's
visits, 10 6 at least some public figures have spoken out against
them. 10 7  The Minister of Disaster Management and the
Construction and Transport Minister publicly expressed regret
over Koizumi's fifth visit.'0 8 Additionally, a recent Osaka high
court decision ruled Koizumi's visits are in a public capacity and
as such are an unconstitutional violation of the separation of
religion and state.'0 9 However, a Tokyo high court rendered an
opposite verdict the day before, indicating that Koizumi's visits
were in his private capacity."0  Regardless of the verdict, such
decisions have little chance of preventing the prime minister from
visiting the shrine, considering the lack of "binding power on the
executive... branch[,]" and the little-covered fact that this aspect
of both opinions was actually dicta."'
There are some signs that Koizumi heeded the heavy criticism
of his repeated Yasukuni visits. On his fifth visit, Koizumi made
several changes to his traditional manner of worship to support his
assertion that he visits as a private individual rather than as a
106 See Over 50% Approve of Yasukuni Shrine Visit, supra note 96; McCurry, supra
note 90.
107 The newly elected leader of the opposition party, the DPJ, Ichiro Ozawa, openly
criticized Koizumi's visit. Ozawa Strikes Out at Yasukuni Visits, ASAHI (Tokyo), May
12, 2006 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
108 Cabinet Divided Over Visit, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Oct. 19, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 16926099.
109 See Court Decision a Warning to Koizumi, ASAHI (Tokyo), Sept. 30, 2005,
available at Factiva.
110 See id.
III Reiji Yoshida, High Courts Not on the Same Page on Yasukuni Visits, JAPAN
TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 5, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20051005fl.html (registration required to access the article). The principal
opinion in both rulings held that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue the federal
government due to lack of injury. See id. Interestingly, the LDP's draft constitution
"implicitly allows government officials to support religious activities within the bounds
of social courtesy, manners[,] and customs-an apparent move to justify official visits to
religious institutions such as Yasukuni Shrine." Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside,
supra note 6.
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public official."12 For example, he wore a business suit rather than
formal Japanese attire, did not sign the guestbook as prime
minister, and did not enter the main hall of the shrine.1 3 Possibly
undermining such efforts, the day after Koizumi's fifth visit, 101
Japanese lawmakers visited the shrine en masse in a show of
solidarity and support."4 Furthermore, on his sixth and final visit,
Koizumi reverted back to wearing a formal tuxedo, signed the
guest book as Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and entered the
main hall of the shrine." 5
In an effort to sidestep Japanese nationalist pride without
ruining relations with China and South Korea, some are pushing
for the construction of a new, secular outdoor memorial akin to
Arlington National Cemetery."6  One promising site that has
received some consensus is Shinjuku Gardens near the center of
government in Tokyo. 117  More recent suggestions, equally
promising, include a plan to remove Class A war criminals from
enshrinement"18 or to convert Yasukuni into a public institution."9
112 See Koizumi Makes Fifth Visit to Yasukuni Shrine, supra note 89. Minister of
Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura compared the visit to "'a Christian having a right
to go to church."' Park Song-wu, Tokyo Wants Roh to Visit Japan: Machimura, KOREA
TIMES (Seoul), Oct. 19, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 16946211.
113 Koizumi Makes Fifth Visit to Yasukuni Shrine, supra note 89.
114 See 101 Lawmakers Visit Yasukuni Shrine, ASAHI (Tokyo), Oct. 18, 2005 (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
115 See Defiant Koizumi visits Yasukuni, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Aug. 16, 2006,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2006O8l6al.html (registration
required to access the article); Onishi, supra note 71; Koizumi Goes Ahead With Shrine
Visit, ASAHI (Tokyo), Aug. 16, 2006, available at http://www.asahi.comlenglish/Herald-
asahi/TKY200608160169.html.
116 See Kakunosuke Akiyama, Editorial, Japan Needs a National Cemetery for War
Dead, Asahi (Tokyo), Sept. 5, 2006, available at http://www.asahi.comlenglish/Herald-
asahi/TKY200609050097.html; Govt Must Expedite New War Memorial, supra note 75;
Editorial, War Memorial, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Nov. 11, 2005, available at
LEXIS. Koizumi himself has promised considering such a facility. Id. However,
Koizumi has, to a certain extent, stepped back his commitment to the new memorial by
"correct[ing] his words from 'promised' to 'said."' Jin, supra note 86.
117 See Govt Must Expedite New War Memorial, supra note 75; Makiko Tanaka,
Editorial, Koizumi Just Another Old-Guard LDP Politician, ASAHI (Tokyo), Nov. 2,
2005, available at Factiva.
118 See Editorial, Yoshibumi Wakamiya, Now Is the Time to Consider the
Alternatives, ASAHI (Tokyo), Aug. 16, 2006, available at http://www.
asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200608150555.html; Yamasaki OK with Class-A
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However, with prominent politicians continuing to publicly voice
support for continued Yasukuni visits, this issue will likely
dominate domestic politics for the foreseeable future. 120
3. Textbook Controversy
Another issue sparking much protest from China and South
Korea is the use in some Japanese schools of history textbooks
that downplay Japan's wartime atrocities. For example, in 1997,
all junior high school history textbooks contained passages about
the use of sex slave "comfort women" during the war.'2 1 By 2005,
only "two of eight acknowledge[d] them.' ' 122  Also, the 1997
edition of one textbook stated that "700,000 people were forcibly
taken to Japan between 1939 and 1945 [as laborers]" while the
latest edition merely says "[t]here were Koreans and Chinese who
were brought to Japan and made to work against their will.'
123
A group lobbying for such changes, the Japanese Society for
History Textbook Reform, or Tsukurukai,124 argues that the old
"masochistic education" program made "the youth lose their pride
and confidence in their own country."' 125 Despite the fact that the
Tsukurukai-sponsored "New History Textbook"'' 2 6 is currently
only used by 0.44 percent of the overall junior high school
Removal, ASAHI (Tokyo), July 24, 2006, available at http://www.asahi.
com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200607240138.html.
119 See Hiroshi Oyama & Tetsuya Ennyu, Aso Suggestion for Yasukuni Shrine Stirs
Up Debate, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 10, 2006, available at LEXIS; Head Priest
Positive on Proposal, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 10, 2006, available at LEXIS;
Editorial, Yasukuni Issue, ASAHI (Tokyo), Aug. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.asahi.comenglish/Herald-asahifrKY200608100124.html; Yu Nogami,
Editorial, Can Old Twist on Old Plot Defuse Yasukuni?, ASAHI (Tokyo), Aug. 9, 2006,
available at http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahiTKY20060809013 1.html.
120 See Cabinet Moves Push Reform, ASIA AFRICA INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Nov. 1,
2005, available at LEXIS.
121 See Norimitsu Onishi, In Japan's New Texts, Lessons in Rising Nationalism,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, at WK 4.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Tokyo District Adopts History Row Textbook, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), Aug. 13,
2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/1 3/content_
468638.htm.
125 Onishi, supra note 121.
126 Tokyo District Adopts History Row Textbook, supra note 124.
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population, that nevertheless represents a tenfold increase since
2001.127 Based on this success, Tsukurukai plans to expand its
influence by creating a junior high school geography textbook as
well."28
The success of nationalist-toned textbooks in Japan has not
gone unnoticed abroad. Japan's April approval of the latest
version of the Tsukurukai book sparked a series of "violent anti-
Japanese demonstrations"'' 29 in China, the largest "since the two
countries re-established relations in 1972. " 30 In addition, a
petition was signed by 80,000 Chinese demanding that Japan
publish a more accurate account of its forced labor during the
war. 3' South Korea has also criticized the textbook revisions,
claiming they try to "justify a colonial past."' 3 2 It is likely that
Japan's noticeable trend towards nationalist textbook revision will
continue to cause great friction with neighboring countries,
particularly since Prime Minister Abe is known for his "support[
of] nationalist scholars in their efforts to revise school
textbooks[.]"' 33
An even more recent trend towards outright nationalism in
education will not ease tensions with Japan's East Asian
neighbors. Prior to the American occupation at the end of WWH,
the Imperial Rescript of Education promulgated ultra-nationalistic
requirements such as instituting the worship of the emperor as a
civic duty for all citizens. 34 Now, the LDP and coalition party
partner Komeito have agreed to update the language of the
American-promulgated replacement to the Imperial Rescript, the
Fundamental Law of Education. The revisions will "emphasize
127 Akemi Nakamura, Textbook Revisionists Plan to Diversity, JAPAN TIMES
(Tokyo), Sept. 3, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20
050903a2.html (registration required to access the article).
128 See id.
129 McCurry, supra note 90.
130 Onishi, supra note 121.
131 See Chinese Laborers Demand Tokyo's Apology, supra note 63.
132 Onishi, supra note 121.
133 Onishi, supra note 71.
134 KENNETH L. PORT, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN
30 (1996).
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love of Japan [and] to nuture patriotism."' 135  Furthermore, in the
Saitama prefecture, many schools have begun grading pupils on
patriotism and love of the nation. 136 In one Saitama city, the board
of education went so far as to "hunt[] down guests who did not
stand up and sing" a nationalistic anthem during a spring
graduation and enrollment ceremony. 137
4. Specific Bi-Lateral Disputes
i. China
An additional dispute that has recently plagued Japan-China
relations is the discovery and exploration of natural gas and oil
fields in the East China Sea, at a location approximately
equidistant between the two nations. 13 8 Though bi-lateral drilling
rights discussions have not been finalized, there is evidence
suggesting that two Chinese drilling platforms are already in
operation. 139  To make matters worse, China has sent naval
destroyers and frigates to patrol the areas surrounding the
platforms. 4 ° In response, Japan has granted drilling rights to the
Japanese company Teikoku Oil. 14 1  If Teikoku proceeds with
135 Ruling Camp Agrees on Patriotism Under New Education Law, JIJi PRESS
TICKER SERVICE, Apr. 12, 2006, available at LEXIS.
136 See Headache for Saitama Teachers; Schools Grade Kids on Patriotism, ASAHI
(Tokyo), May 27, 2006 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
137 Board Seeks Guests Who Sat During "Kimigayo", ASAHI (Tokyo), June 21,
2006, available at http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200606210153.html.
After a similar circumstance, the Tokyo District Court recently ruled in 2006 that
teachers could not be forced to stand and sing the national anthem. See Teachers Not
Obliged to Stand and Sing Anthem, Court Rules, ASAHI (Tokyo), Sept. 22, 2006,
available at http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200609210422.html. The
Board of Education has indicated that it will appeal. Id.
138 See Anthony Faiola, Japan-China Oil Dispute Escalates, WASH. POST, Oct. 22,
2005, at A17.
139 See id. A recent poll showed that "[sleventy percent of Japanese think China
should suspend unilateral development" of the oil and natural gas fields. Poll: 70%
Want China to Suspend Gas Drilling, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Oct. 18, 2005, available
at 2005 WLNR 16874952.
140 See Oil and Gas in Troubled Waters, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8-14, 2005, at 52.
141 See id. Unfortunately, the fact that Teikoku Oil translates to Imperial Oil will
not likely put China at ease. See id.
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drilling before negotiations have concluded, particularly if
accompanied by "an escort of Japanese coast guard vessels," this
would be viewed by China "as an invasion of Chinese territory
and . . a highly provocative act."'
142
The deteriorating political relationship with China has caused
Japan to lose out on some otherwise lucrative development
projects in China.'43 For example, because of the Yasukuni issue,
China decided against importing Japan's Shinkansen bullet train
technology.'" Additionally, in Japan, deterioration of the political
relationship has caused a significant decline in high school field
trips to China.'45 Furthermore, officials on both sides have made
provocative comments, such as a Chinese general who indicated a
readiness to use nuclear weapons 46 and comments from Tokyo's
142 Faiola, supra note 138. Japan has also been on the lookout for provocation,
having scrambled its fighter jets thirty times this year, a record, to respond to Chinese
aircraft approaching Japanese airspace. See Fighters Scrambled Record 30 Times to
Intercept Chinese Planes, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Nov. 10, 2005, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2005 II Oa I.html (registration required to access
the article). Since then, in April, 2006, China instituted a shipping ban in the regions
surrounding the gas field. China Bans Vessels Near Gas Field: Report, JAPAN TIMEs
(Tokyo), Apr. 17, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20060417al.html (registration required to access the article). Immediately
afterwards, however, China reversed the ban, referring to it as a "'technical mistake."'
Reiji Yoshida, Shipping Ban in Japan Zone Mistake: China, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Apr.
19, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060419a2.html
(registration required to access the article).
143 The poor relationship has not, however, stopped China from buying more
electronics and cars from Japan than ever. See Ralph Jennings, Chinese Feelings on
Japan Mixed, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Nov. 11, 2005, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20051 Il f2.html (registration required to access
the article).
144 Tanaka, supra note 117. China appears to have changed its mind in this matter
and has since agreed to invest in Shinkansen technology. Kazumasa Higashi,
Shinkansen on Track for China Network, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Nov. 22, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 18866382.
145 See China Drops from Ist to 4"h as Destination for High School Trips, ASAHI
(Tokyo), Oct. 26, 2005(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation). A recent poll has indicated that positive feelings for China
within Japan are at the lowest level since 1978. Fewer Japanese Feel Friendly Toward
China, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Dec. 25, 2005, available at LEXIS.
146 See Joseph Kahn, China General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if U.S. Intrudes,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2005 at A8 (describing a Chinese general's threat to use nuclear
weapons against the United States if its military intervenes in a conflict over Taiwan, an
ally of the United States and Japan).
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governor alleging the Chinese government "holds no value at all
for human life."' 4 7  In this hostile environment, any changes to
Japan's pacifist constitution will provoke a "high degree of
concern" from China. 148
ii. Korea
In Korea, there are "negative feelings"'149 and lingering distrust
of Japan over its acknowledgment of war responsibility and its
treatment of Korea during its colonial occupation. 5 ° Japan is also
in a dispute with South Korea for legal title over the small island
of Dokdo (or Takeshima in Japanese).'' While Japan annexed the
island in 1905 along with Korea, South Korea appears to have
greater historical claim of ownership, and currently has
possession. 152  Japan has eased matters somewhat and shown
goodwill by returning a 300-year-old Korean war monument that
had been confiscated by Japan in 1905.153
147 Ishihara: Life-Respecting U.S. No Match in War Against China, ASAHI (Tokyo),
Nov. 5, 2005, available at Factiva.
148 Japan Should Wake Up to History, supra note 52.
149 Kentaro Kurihara, Ban: Negative Feelings Linger Over Yasukuni, History Issues,
ASAHI (Tokyo), Nov. 11, 2005, available at http://www.alpha-la.org/
link.asp?TOPICID=225 (quoting Ban Ki Moon, South Korea's Foreign Affairs and
Trade Minister in his meeting with former Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso). Aso
also described political relations between the two countries as "very grave[.]" South
Korean Foreign Minister Says Relations with Japan in 'Very Grave' Situation, MAINICHI
DAILY (Tokyo), Nov. 21, 2005 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation).
150 In what is almost certainly a thinly veiled political attack, South Korea has
recently demanded data regarding an estimated 10,000 Koreans who were forced from
the former colony to work in Japan specifically for the mining company previously
owned by the father of former Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso. See H. Ichikawa &
T. Takatsuki, Seoul Seeks Prewar Conscription Data of Aso Company, ASIAVIEwS, Nov.
30, 2005, http://www.asiaviews.org/?content=fddfdfe332wxy4O&report=2005113
0203913.
151 See Hyung K. Lee, Mapping the Law of Legalizing Maps: The Implications of
the Emerging Rule on Map Evidence in International Law, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
159, 186-87 (2005).
152 See id. In 2006 Japan again angered South Korea with its plans for a Coast
Guard survey of the islands. See Mari Yamaguchi, Japan, South Korea Work to Defuse
Dispute, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 19, 2006, available at Factiva.
153 See Japan to Return Looted Stone Monument, CHOSUNILBO, Oct. 11, 2005,
available at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/htmdlnews/200510/200510110019.html.
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Relations are certainly no better between Japan and North
Korea. In 1998, North Korea sent a long-range test missile over
Japan,'54 proving its capability to strike Japan with a nuclear
warhead in approximately ten minutes. 55 While negotiations have
shown some promise, 156 details regarding North Korea's
agreement to "abandon its nuclear weapons program and
dismantle weapons" have yet to materialize.'57 In the meantime,
repercussions from North Korea's 2002 admission to kidnapping
thirteen Japanese citizens are still being felt.'58 While five of the
citizens returned, North Korea claims that the other eight have
since died. 5 9  Japan now demands evidence to support this
assertion.' 60 To make matters worse, in October of 2006, North
Korea conducted its first nuclear test.' 6' This event will likely
dramatically increase already existing tensions in the region. 162
iii. Russia
While Russia does not have the same complaints about the
The monument, Bukgwandaechupbi, had most unhelpfully been displayed by Japan at
the Yasukuni war shrine in Tokyo. See id. The fate of Bukgwandaechupbi is still up in
the air however, since Japan is returning it to South Korea, while it was originally taken
from what is now North Korea. See id.
154 See New East Asia, Old Enmities, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8-14, 2005, at 14.
155 See Takashi Imae, Japan-U.S. Defense Ties Boosted, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Oct. 31, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17599430. In 2006, North Korea sent an
additional seven test missiles, this time landing in the Sea of Japan. See Norimitsu
Onishi, North Korea Flatly Rejects Protests on Missile Firings, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2006, at A 12.
156 See Cameron McLauchlan, DPRK Won't Set Conditions on 6-Way Talks, DAILY
YOMIURI (Tokyo), Oct. 22, 2005, available at LEXIS.
157 Rice Warns N. Korea on New Nuclear Demands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 24,
2005, available at Factiva; see also Editorial, Disappointment in Beijing, JAPAN TIMES
(Tokyo), Nov. 17, 2005 available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed200
51117al.html (discussing the lack of satisfactory momentum in the continuing North
Korean nuclear talks) (registration required to access the article).
158 See Japan, N. Korea to Hold Talks Next Week, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 26,
2005, available at Factiva.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 Martin Fackler, Japan Now Seems Likely to Rally Behind New Prime Minister's
Call for a Stronger Military, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at A8.
162 See id.
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legacy of Imperial Japan as China and Korea, there are lingering
disputes between the two countries that undermine ideal
diplomatic relations. Primary amongst these is a territorial dispute
over a group of four small islands north of Hokkaido and south of
Kamchatka known as the Kuril Islands.'63 In fact, the dispute over
the islands, which have been under Russian control since it
invaded Japan in 19 4 5 ,1" is treated so seriously that it has
prevented the two countries from signing a formal peace treaty
since WWII. 165  It is quite possible that this issue will prevent
Japan from convincing Russia to route a new and much desired oil
pipeline through the Pacific rather than through China, with whom
Russia has stronger ties. 
66
II. History of Article 9
To examine the possibility of revision to the Japanese
Constitution, it is important to first understand how the current
constitution was created. Japan's Constitution did not always have
an express war renunciation clause. In fact, until the Meiji
Restoration that began in 1868, Japan was a feudal state, with
factions representing the emperor and the powerful samurai
shogunate engaging in frequent battles. 67  Beginning in 1868,
however, the forces of the emperor began to consolidate power
163 For a detailed history of this dispute, see Amy B. Quillen, The "Kuril Islands"
or the "Northern Territories": Who Owns Them? Island Territorial Dispute Continues
to Hinder Relations Between Russia and Japan, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 633
(1993).
164 Id. at 637.
165 Id. at 633. As evidence of how seriously the matter is treated, in August of 2006,
the Russian Border Coast Guard fired on a Japanese fishing vessel which had strayed
outside of the authorized fishing area, killing one fisherman. Russian Fire Kills
Fisherman/Crew Member of Japanese Boat Shot Off North Territories, DAILY YOMIURI
(Tokyo), Aug. 17, 2006, available at LEXIS.
166 See N. Isles, Pipeline Issues May Bedevil Putin's Visit, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Oct. 24, 2005, available at LEXIS. Joint economic development of the islands is still a
possibility. See Putin to Present Northern Territories Proposal at Japan-Russia Talks,
MAINICHi DAILY (Tokyo), Nov. 15, 2005, available at LEXIS. In the meantime, Russia
has apparently sought to strengthen its position by building a church on one of the
virtually uninhabited islands. See Russia Erects 'Church' on Suisho Island, DAILY
YOMIURI (Tokyo), Nov. 18, 2005, available at LEXIS.
167 See Hamano, supra note 3, at 421; 'Miracle' Reforms Now the LDP's Main
Mission, AsAm (Tokyo), Nov. 23, 2005, available at LexisNexis Academic.
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and the world witnessed "the emergence of the modem state"' 168 of
Japan out of three centuries of international isolation.
169
The first constitution of Japan, the Meiji Constitution,
appeared in 1889,170 but it did not establish the principle of
pacifism. Rather, the emperor was given the express power to
"declare[] war, make[] peace, and conclude[] treaties."'' 7 1
Furthermore, the Meiji Constitution clearly dictated the absolute
nature of the emperor's power in seventeen articles.17 The
emperor was seen to have come from "a line of Emperors
unbroken for ages etemal 17' as a "sacred arahitogami'' 174 or "god
who appears in human form.' ' 175  The absolute control of the
emperor was finally relinquished on September 2, 1945, when
Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers in Tokyo Bay. 1
76
The United States' occupation of Japan spanned seven years,
from 1945 to 1952, following the end of WWII. 7 7  Starting
October 4, 1945, the United States began demanding a revised
constitution for Japan.' "[T]he Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, directed [the
inclusion of] ... a provision banning a Japanese army, navy, or air
force for any purpose, including preserving Japanese security."'
7 9
168 Hamano, supra note 3, at 418.
169 'Miracle' Reforms Now the LDP's Main Mission, supra note 167.
170 Hamano, supra note 3, at 424.
171 MEIJI KENPO, art. 13.
172 MEIJI KENPO, arts. 1-17.
173 MEI KENPO, art. 1. "Japan's Chrysanthemum Throne claims to have the oldest
line of succession of any monarchy, with the first legendary emperor ascending to the
title 660BC." David Fickling, Japanese Panel Backs Female Emperors, GUARDIAN
(London), Nov. 21, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/japan/story
/0,7369,1647565,00.html.
174 MEI KENPO, art. 3.
175 HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note 5, at 5.
176 "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state
shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers." Instrument of
Surrender by Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733, 1734. "[O]n New Year's Day 1946
[the Emperor] renounced all claims to being divine." HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note
5, at 5.
177 Port, supra note 13, at 140.
178 See Auer, supra note 4, at 172.
179 Id. at 171.
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Following dissatisfaction with the first draft, which expressly
retained armed forces, MacArthur presented his own draft to
Japan. 1
80
A. Original Intent
The American draft first presented the idea of complete war
renunciation.18' Curiously, there is some dispute as to whether the
concept originated on the American or Japanese side. 182  While
MacArthur recalled that former Prime Minister Shidehara first
mentioned it, "Yoshida, Shidehara's Foreign Minister and later
prime minister, stated his belief that MacArthur suggested the idea
to Shidehara and Shidehara agreed."' 183  Subsequent research,
however, has supported MacArthur's position that indeed "[t]he
idea was first suggested by... Shidehara."' In making his point
to MacArthur, Shidehara opined that "in the atomic age, the
survival of mankind should precede all national strategies;...
other nations must follow the same principle of renouncing war if
they themselves [are] to survive.,' 185
When the American draft was submitted, MacArthur made it
clear that the war renunciation clause disarming Japan made no
exceptions, "even for preserving its own security."'' 86  Yoshida,
then acting as Prime Minster, concurred with this view, stating that
Japan was "not allowed... armament" even for maintaining
180 See id. at 173. Interestingly, SCAP also pressured Japan to include advanced
human rights provisions that went even further than the American Constitution. See
Hamano, supra note 3, at 430-39. For example, this includes the right to "[a]cademic
freedom." KENPO, art. 23. Perhaps the most interesting provision in this regard is the
Japanese Constitution's allocation of the positive duty that "[t]he freedoms and rights
guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant
endeavor of the people." KENPO, art. 12.
181 See Auer, supra note 4, at 173.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Kenzo Takayanagi, Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the
Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67, 71,
79 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968).
185 Id. at 86.
186 Auer, supra note 4, at 173 (quoting 0. NISHI, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN JAPAN (1987)). MacArthur later contradicted
himself saying that the renunciation clause did not rule out the right to self-defense. Id.
at 174.
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security." 7 While the original intent of both sides may now be
clear, this absolutist view did not last long.
By the summer of 1946, the "so-called Ashida amendment"
served to obfuscate the clarity of the unconditional disarmament
originally intended even before the constitution was finalized.
188
First, the amendment added the phrase "aspiring sincerely to an
international peace based on justice and order" to the first section
of Article 9.189 "Second, the words '[i]n order to accomplish the
aim of the preceding paragraph' were added to the beginning of
the second sentence."' 90 Some argue that by clarifying that the
renunciation of arms is for the purpose of aspiring to international
peace, the disarmament was not intended to be absolute, but rather
"specifically designed to allow rearmament for the purpose of self-
defense."' 9' Nevertheless, the explanation given to Japanese
students immediately after the promulgation of the new
constitution was that, while Japan had the right to self-defense
according to international law, it had voluntarily restrained itself in
this regard "by virtue of the second paragraph" of Article 9.192
B. Rise of the SDF
It did not take long, however, for the newer, less absolute view
of Article 9 to be used to argue for the constitutionality of national
self-defense. While the chief goal of the occupation had been the
complete disarmament of Japan,'93 the United States had reason to
regret it by the onset of the Korean War by 1950. 194 When North
Korea invaded South Korea with a force of 135,000 men, the only
187 Edward J.L. Southgate, From Japan to Afghanistan: The U.S.-Japan Joint
Security Relationship, The War on Terror, and the Ignominious End of the Pacifist
State?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1609 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
188 Derek Van Hoften, Declaring War on the Japanese Constitution: Japan's Right
to Military Sovereignty and the United States' Right to Military Presence in Japan, 26
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 293-94 (2003).
189 Auer, supra note 4, at 175.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 176.
193 Port, supra note 13, at 140.
194 See Southgate, supra note 187, at 1612. The Korean War began only "a few
weeks after the third birthday of Article 9." Maki, supra note 50, at 74.
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sufficient force the United States had in the region was stationed
in Japan as the occupying army. 195  As a result, MacArthur
redeployed that division, leaving "a void in Japan.' 96 On July 8,
1950, in response to this newly created void, MacArthur requested
that Yoshida "form a 75,000-man National Police Reserve
(NPR)."'197
One of the unique characteristics of the NPR was that
personnel and vehicles were carefully given names to avoid
comparison with a real army. 198 For example, tanks were called
"special vehicles" and former colonels and soldiers were now
called "reserve policemen."'199 This reflects the apprehension of
the administration at the time that the NPR could be construed as a
violation of the constitution. Prime Minister Yoshida stated in
1952 that "'to maintain war potential, even for the purpose of self-
defense, would mean rearmament [and] would necessitate revision
of the Constitution.,
20 0
Yoshida's position quickly changed that very year, as he took
charge of the self-defense force, now re-named the National Safety
Forces (NSF).2°' In this new capacity, Yoshida now maintained
that "war potential ... could be differentiated from 'defense
potential' and that the NSF were not unconstitutional because they
had no capability to wage modem warfare. 2 2  This change of
heart was well-timed, considering the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty, which, in addition to allowing United States armed forces
to be stationed in Japan, came with the "expectation... that Japan
will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own
defense. 2 °3
By 1954, the NSF had morphed into the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) and with this change came a more direct statement from the
195 See Port, supra note 13, at 140-41.
196 Id. at 141.
197 Auer, supra note 4, at 176.
198 See id. at 177.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See id.
202 Id.
203 Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, U.S.-Japan,
Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329.
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government-"the case of military power as a means of defending
the nation when the nation has been attacked by military power is
not counter to the Constitution., 20 4 The scope of the SDF had also
grown significantly in comparison to the NPR, with the force now
possessing ground, maritime, and air force components. 2 5  By
1959, former Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi and his Cabinet
announced "there is nothing to prevent the maintaining of the
minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defense" and
"counter attacks on enemy bases are within the scope of self-
defense.,
206
Nineteen Sixty heralded a revision to the 1951 treaty in the
form of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security, 2°7 accompanied by domestic protests feverish enough to
"bring down" the administration. 20 8 While the next thirty-seven
years were relatively uneventful in terms of official developments,
the SDF quietly continued to increase in size.2 In order to "ease
fears that the SDF would grow too large," Japan committed to
limit defense expenditures to no more than 1 percent of the Gross
National Product (GNP) in 1976.210 This was made quite easy
considering the "phenomenal double digit growth of the GNP rate
in the 1960[s].,, 211 By the 1980s, however, economic "slowdown"
made this goal difficult to reach 212 and it was finally abandoned in
204 Auer, supra note 4, at 178 (citing K. MASUHARA, NIHON NO BOEI [JAPAN'S
DEFENSE] 57, 58 (1961)).
205 See id.
206 Id. at 178-79 (citing MASUHARA, supra note 204, at 59). This sentiment has
been confirmed by Abe's current administration; LDP Policy Research Council
Chairman Shoichi Nakagawa indicated that "[t]he government interprets the Constitution
as allowing Japan to possess nuclear weapons as part of its minimum necessary
requirements to defend itself." Top LDP Policymaker Says Possession of Nuclear Arms
Permitted Under Constitution, MAINICHI DAILY (Tokyo), Oct. 31, 2006, available at
LEXIS. Following North Korea's nuclear test in 2006, there has even been some
discussion of nuclear weapon possession in the Abe cabinet. See Hawks Circling as
Constitution Turns 60, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), available at http://search.
japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2006ll07fl .html (registration required to access the article).
207 Id. at 179.
208 Southgate, supra note 187, at 1615.
209 See Auer, supra note 4, at 180.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 180 n.39.
212 Id. at 180.
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1987, to be replaced by a "new nonquantitative limit. 213
In the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,
the United States and Japan once again updated their security
relationship, and once again expanded Japan's role in its own
security.214  While the Guidelines provide the qualification that
Japan should "conduct all of its actions within the limits of its
Constitution, 2 5 there is no accompanying clarification as to how
the new requirements will allow the SDF to remain within the
constraints of Article 9. For example, in addition to now having
"primary responsibility" for its own defense, 1 6 Japan now has
extended security responsibilities into the somewhat nebulous
"areas surrounding Japan."2'1 7
In this new role, Japan must defend "surrounding waters
and... sea lines of communication[.] ' '2 8 The range of this
responsibility is not defined geographically, but rather is said to be
"situational," presumably to be defined by the parameters of a
potential threat. 2'9  The range of situations which qualify for
Japanese military action include those that "will have an important
influence on Japan's peace and security., 220  One commentator
understands this vague language to at least include conflicts
between North and South Korea or China and Taiwan, and notes
the anxiety this will likely cause Japan's closest neighbors. 22'
Perhaps the aspect of the Guidelines that most directly
challenges Article 9 is the requirement that Japan provide "rear
area support" for the United States military operations related to
the treaty "on the high seas and international airspace around
Japan .... ,222 If taken literally, Japan could be required to
213 Id. at 180-81.
214 Hoften, supra note 188, at 299.
215 Japan-United States: Joint Statement on Review of Defense Cooperation
Guidelines and Defense Cooperation Guidelines, U.S.-Japan, art. 2 2, Sept. 23, 1997,
36 I.L.M. 1621, 1625 [hereinafter Guidelines].
216 Id. art. 4 2(l)(a).
217 Id. art. 4 1.
218 Id. art. 4 2(2)(b).
219 Id. art. 5.
220 Id.
221 Southgate, supra note 187, at 1617.
222 Guidelines, supra note 215, art. 5 12(2)(b).
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conduct military activities and provide support in areas
unquestionably beyond Japan's national borders. As one
commentator noted, even if a "revisionist" interpretation of Article
9 is taken for granted, it is difficult to distinguish between self-
defense and war potential when dealing with military support for
another country's armed forces beyond the borders of Japan. 23 To
a certain extent, Japan felt it was acting in self-defense, or at least
"in order to survive," when it attacked Pearl Harbor as a response
to an American scrap metal and fuel embargo against Japan.2 24 It
was likely then that when Article 9 was originally discussed in the
Japanese legislature, there was a fear that "if the Constitution
allows a defensive war, such prohibition can easily be evaded ...
[leading to] a risk that Japan might start a war under the name of
self-defense. 225
Japan's definition of self-defense was further broadened after
the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.226 On
October 29, 2001, the Japanese legislature approved the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law, which goes beyond the
constraints of the 1997 Guidelines by allowing Japan to support
United States military activities in the actual "territory of foreign
countries ... 227 While such Japanese operations are to be
conducted "in areas where combat is not taking place,, 228 Japanese
forces are authorized to return fire "when an unavoidable and
reasonable cause exists for use of weapons to protect lives and
bodies of themselves... or those who are with them ..... 229 As
one commentator notes, arguing that "support of a 'war' on
terrorism is 'defensive' is tantamount to claiming that the best
defense is a good offense. 230
223 Southgate, supra note 187, at 1619.
224 See Port, supra note 13, at 135.
225 Id. at 143.
226 See Southgate, supra note 187, at 1619.
227 Id. at 1620.
228 Id. at 1621.
229 Id. at 1620.
230 Id. at 1622. Despite such constitutional concerns, support for the Anti-Terrorism
law in the legislature remains strong. See Lower House Passes Extension of Anti-
Terrorism Law, ASAH! (Tokyo), Oct. 18, 2005, available at Factiva. The chief activity
under the law has been the maintenance of what amounts to a free filling station in the
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C. The SDF Today
There are many geographic, political, and social, factors that
would seem to naturally limit the necessity of a large Japanese
military force. The surrounding waters of the islands work as "a
defensive moat" creating a situation where any invader must have
"the will to suffer the losses that even a limited defense could
inflict., 231 In addition, Japan lacks natural resources, a factor
which once motivated Japan's own aggressions.232 In any event,
the resources Japan possesses today that might interest a potential
invader, industry and technology, would be destroyed in an
attempt to gain them.233  Finally, though the affected generations
are disappearing, there is a "deep scar left on the national psyche
by the tragedy of the lost war with its suffering, death, and
devastation." '234Still, popular support for the SD 235 continuing pressure from
the United States to assume more responsibility in cooperative
military defense,236 and the threat of some of the largest military
powers in the world as neighbors have spurred the SDF into what
it is today-a formidable force even by international standards.
"Japan currently spends roughly the same amount as Britain on its
Indian Ocean for the navies of friendly forces. See Editorial, Extending the SDF
Missions, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Sept. 30, 2005, available at Factiva. The latest interim
report on Japanese and American security cooperation further expands the role of the
SDF, in part by reducing the overall number of American troops stationed in Japan,
moving roughly 7,000 marines from Okinawa to other areas including Guam. U.S.-
Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, U.S.-Japan, art. 3 2,
Oct. 29, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/55886.pdf.
The report also discusses the bi-lateral responsibilities of Japan and the United States in
their "[e]fforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in
international peace cooperation activities." Id. art. 2 1.
231 Maki, supra note 50, at 75.
232 Id. at 76.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 77.
235 Id.
236 See id. at 76. After previous comments criticizing Japan's unwillingness to send
international military support, former United States Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage suggested in 2004 that Article 9 and the Japanese Constitution's prohibition of
a military "imped[ed] the Japan-U.S. alliance." Weston S. Konishi, Opinion, Time to
Take a Hard Look at Article 9, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), July 28, 2004, available at
LEXIS.
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military, an amount which places the country third in the world
behind only the United States and Russia., 237  In addition to
having a force of more than 240,000,238 Japan also has over 1100
tanks and approximately fifty destroyers, fifteen submarines, and
475 combat aircraft. 239  "Japan spends more money defending its
territory per square mile than any other country in the world,
except the United Kingdom., 240 "[A]s of 2001, ten of the top 100
arms producing corporations were Japanese companies. '"241
The SDF also continues to grow in terms of cutting edge
military technology. Currently, Japan and the United States are
jointly developing a Pacific missile defense program with an
estimated price tag of around three billion dollars, including
Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missiles designed to "intercept and
destroy incoming ballistic and cruise missiles. 24 2 Japan is also
currently developing a state-of-the-art "secret intelligence service
along the lines of Britain's M16 to conduct overseas espionage.,' 243
These efforts will include gathering information about North
Korea and its other neighbors using high altitude unmanned aerial
vehicles, and sharing such information with the United States.2"
One commentator has even predicted that Japan will soon possess
offensive nuclear capabilities. 45
237 Hoften, supra note 188, at 296.
238 Freire, supra note 2.
239 Id.
240 Port, supra note 13, at 148.
241 Id. at 150.
242 ASDF Batteries to Get Advanced Missiles by 2010, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Oct.
10, 2005, available at http://search'japantimes.co.jp/member/member.html?mode=
makeprfy&file=nn20051010a2.html (registration required to access the article).
243 Tsukasa Arita, James Bond Goes Japanese? Tokyo Eyes M16-Style Spy Agency,
JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 21, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20051021 f2.html (registration required to access the article).
244 Interim Report Stresses Defense Cooperation Between Japan, U.S., ASAHI
(Tokyo), Oct. 28, 2005 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
245 See Robyn Lim, Editorial, Toward a Nuclear Japan?, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo),
Sept. 29, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20050929rl.html
(registration required to access the article). Some nations already "may view Japan with
suspicion" regarding its continuing nuclear power projects. Editorial, Nuclear Program
Raises Issues, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 14, 2005, available at http://search.
japantimes.co.jp/print/ed20051014al.html (registration required to access the article).
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The SDF is now more active internationally than ever before.
In addition to a 1992 peacekeeping mission in Cambodia and
logistical support for the UN in the Golan Heights,246 the SDF has
recently engaged in several large-scale operations in the Middle
East. In support of "U.S.-led troops in Afghanistan," Japan has
and will continue to provide fuel for "coalition warships in the
Indian Ocean" until at least late 2006.247 "Japan ... also stationed
600 non-combat troops in the.., city of Samawah on... [a]
humanitarian mission to purify water, rebuild schools, and other
tasks" as part of United States-led efforts in Iraq.248 And, despite
arguments to the contrary,249 Japan did not decide to pull its troops
out of Iraq until June 2006.250 Furthermore, the SDF has also
recently engaged in humanitarian aid for the tsunami victims in
Indonesia and earthquake victims in Pakistan. 2 1  The Japanese
Coast Guard has even been in cooperation with India to help fight
piracy on the high seas.252
III. Constitutionality of the SDF under Article 9
The Constitution of Japan declares itself to be "the supreme
However, currently Japan has not stepped down from its 1967 policy of "three non-
nuclear principles, whereby Japan pledge[s] not to possess or manufacture nuclear
weapons, and not to allow nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan." Auer, supra note
4, at 178.
246 Port, supra note 13, at 132.
247 Japan to Extend Afghan Anti-Terror Mission, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 18, 2005,
available at Factiva. Some in Japan criticize the country for providing what amounts to
a "free gasoline station." Id.
248 Id.
249 See Govt May Pull GSDF Out of Iraq in '06 s* Half, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Sept. 29, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15359346.
250 See Norimitsu Onishi, Japan to Pull Its Ground Troops Out of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2006 at A8.
251 See Japan to Dispatch Transport Helicopters, GSDF Members to Quake-Hit
Pakistan, ASAHI (Tokyo), Oct. 11, 2005 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation). Similarly, Japan dispatched troops to
aid quake-ridden Indonesia in 2006. SDF Team Opens Clinic in Quake-Hit Java Town,
JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), June 4, 2006, available at http://search.
japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20060604a4.html (registration required to access the article).
252 See Japanese, Indian Coast Guards Agree to Closer Cooperation Against
Terrorism, Pirates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 16, 2005, available at Factiva.
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law of the nation., 253  The apparent disconnect between the
constitutional revocation of war and military and the relatively
boundless growth of the SDF has not gone unnoticed. In addition
to extensive protests of the SDF and security arrangements with
the United States, most prominently in 1960,254 the Japanese
judicial system heard cases which attempted to have the SDF
found unconstitutional under Article 9. Despite having the "power
to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or
official act,"25 the courts have thus far refused to rule against the
SDF 56
A. Judicial "Response"
The likelihood that a Japanese high court would find the SDF
unconstitutional is very low, given that "the Japanese Supreme
Court has pursued a policy of extreme deference to the legislature
in exercising judicial review. '  In fact, the Japanese Supreme
Court "has only found laws to be unconstitutional six times. 258
Even where a law is found unconstitutional, the Court will at times
"offer no remedy other than[] to seek redress from the
legislature. 259  Nevertheless, these circumstances have not
prevented attempts to challenge the constitutionality of the SDF.
253 KENPO, art. 98.
254 See Southgate, supra note 187, at 1615.
255 KENPO, art. 81.
256 See Sakata v. Japan (The Sunakawa Case), 13 Keishdi 3225 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 16,
1959), reprinted in COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS, 1948-60 298 (John M. Maki ed., 1964); Ito et al. v. Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries (The Naganuma Missile Site Case, I), 712 HANREI JIHO 24
(Sapporo D. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN,
1970 THROUGH 1990 (Lawrence W. Beer & Hiroshi Itoh eds., 1996); Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries v. Ito et al (The Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case,
II), 27 GYOSAI REISHO 8 (Sapporo High Ct., Aug. 5, 1976), reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990; Uno et al v. Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (The Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case, III), 36
MINSHO 9 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 1982), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF
JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990; Ishizuka et al v. Japan et al (The Hyakuri Air Base Case),
43 Minsho 6 (Sup. Ct., June 20, 1989), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF
JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990.
257 Southgate, supra note 187, at 1624.
258 Hamano, supra note 3, at 459.
259 Id. at 462-63.
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The most celebrated of these cases is known as The Sunakawa
Case.260 While the case technically did not directly address the
SDF itself, many have used it to argue for the constitutionality of
the fighting force. 261 As a defense to the destruction of fences and
interference with a property survey at a United States military base
in Japan, local protester defendants challenged the
constitutionality of the security treaty between the United States
and Japan.262 Reversing a lower court acquittal, the Supreme
Court sidestepped the constitutionality of the treaty, stating that
due to the "highly political nature [of the treaty,] ... the legal
decision as to unconstitutionality has a character which ... is not
adaptable to review by a judicial court. .. [and] must be entrusted
to the decision of the. . ." executive and legislative branches.263 In
very important dicta the court clearly stated that Article 9 "in no
way denies the inherent right of self-defense, which our country
possesses as a sovereign nation. ' '264 Rather, the "war potential
[that is] forever renounced ... is the resort to what is called
aggressive war., 26
5
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan began reclassifying
part of the forest reserves of the northern island of Hokkaido in
order to develop an anti-aircraft missile base for the SDF.266 In a
series of cases known as the Naganuma Nike cases, protesters
directly challenged the constitutionality of the SDF.267 At first, the
protesters were successful in the Sapporo District Court.268 In an
attempt to avoid directly contradicting the Supreme Court's
decision in the Sunakawa Case, the District Court maintained that
Japan does indeed possess a right to self-defense, but added that
260 Sakata, reprinted in COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60, supra note 256, at 298.
261 Fisher, supra note 20, at 410.
262 See Southgate, supra note 187, at 1625.
263 Sakata, reprinted in COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60, supra note 256, at 305-06.
264 Id. at 303.
265 Id. at 304.
266 Southgate, supra note 187, at 1626.
267 Id.
268 See Ito et al. v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 256, at 83.
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this is "related to the social, economic, and political concerns of
the country and to international concerns such as its international
position and its diplomacy., 269 Thus, Article 9 does not allow an
advanced military force but only "reliance on peaceful diplomacy
to avoid aggression; use of the police force, which is mainly for
internal security;... mass uprisings in which the people take up
arms and resist; confiscation of the property held by citizens of the
aggressor country, or deportation of those individuals. 27 °
This decision was "promptly reversed"271 by the Sapporo High
Court,272 which held that if the SDF clearly had an aggressive
nature, it would be unconstitutional.273 Since it found that the SDF
was not "at first sight... clearly aggressive[,] ... the problem...
is a decision concerning state governance [and should] ultimately
be entrusted to... political judgment., 274  The decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, which did not reach the
constitutionality issue.275
The Supreme Court has continued to exercise constitutional
avoidance when conflicts arise between the SDF and Article 9.276
Despite some willingness in lower courts to find government
action unconstitutional,277 it remains highly unlikely that the
Japanese Supreme Court will hold the SDF to be
269 Id. at 101.
270 Id. at 102.
271 Southgate, supra note 187, at 1627.
272 See Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries v. Ito et al, reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 256, at 112
(holding that Article 9 does not reach private law matters, in response to a contractual
dispute between local protesters attempting to buy land and refuse to sell it to the SDF
for military development).
273 Id. at 121.
274 Id. at 122.
275 See Uno et al v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, reprinted in
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 256, at 122.
276 See Ishizuka et al v. Japan et al (The Hyakuri Air Base Case), reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 256, at 130-31.
277 See Court Decision a Warning to Koizumi, supra note 109 (reporting the Osaka
High Court's ruling that Koizumi's visits, held to be in a public capacity, to the
Yasukuni War Shrine were unconstitutional in light of a prohibition of religious activity
by the government).
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unconstitutional.278 If change occurs it will likely come from the
political branches-the executive or legislature-which hold
greater power.279
B. Executive & Legislative Interpretations of Article 9
Starting in 1953, the Japanese executive branch stated that
Article 9 does not prohibit military power for self-defense. 28' By
1965, former Prime Minister Ikeda backed away from any static
limitations to the SDF, stating that such limits "are not to be
determined conceptually or numerically, but.., according to the
national situation, world affairs, and the development of scientific
techniques., 281  The next prime minister, Sato, mirrored this
sentiment, stating that since the conditions required for self-
defense will also be changing, "it would be difficult to show where
the limit is. ' 282 In 1981, former Prime Minister Suzuki stated that
the national policy for self-defense reached as far as one thousand
miles in the air and surrounding seas.283 By 1994, former Prime
Minister Murayama went so far as to explicitly declare the current
SDF to be constitutional.284
Despite protests along the way, the executive branch has also
benefited substantially from a policy of liberal interpretation of
Article 9. For example, in exchange for ignoring enormous
pressure from Japanese citizens to discontinue Japan's role as a
"silent partner" in the United State's war in Vietnam, former
Prime Minister Sato was able to gain the return of the island of
Okinawa, "which had been held by the United States since
WWII. ' 285  Additionally, in exchange for Japan's continued
278 For an interesting exploration into the degree of political influence and control of
the Japanese judiciary, see Hamano, supra note 3, at 452-59.
279 See Fisher, supra note 20, at 413. Regardless of whether the Japanese Supreme
Court is deliberately avoiding the constitutionality of the SDF, "the practical effect is the
continued existence of the SDF and unfettered power by the Cabinet and the Diet to
determine defense policy." Id.
280 Auer, supra note 4, at 178.
281 Id. at 179-80.
282 Id. at 180.
283 Id.
284 Fisher, supra note 20, at 415-16.
285 Id. at 416.
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cooperation with the United States in security treaties, Japan
enjoys the "extended deterrence [of] the U.S. 'nuclear
umbrella.' ,,286
The Japanese legislature, known as the Diet, has also taken its
part in the continued expansion of the SDF. The 2001 anti-
terrorism law, which will likely be renewed for the foreseeable
future,287 declared SDF action in Iraq to be constitutional.288 In
1992, the Diet passed the U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations Law,
designed to minimize the situations where the SDF is required to
use force.289 But as it stands now, it is "unlikely that the Diet will
do more than nominally observe the strictures of Article 9.,,290
C. Legal Strategies for Finding the SDF Constitutional
Apart from the judicial policy of avoidance regarding Article
9,291 there have been several legal theories that attempt to justify
the SDF within the confines of the current Constitution of Japan.292
Perhaps foremost amongst these is constitutional transformation.293
Under this theory, a nation's interpretation of a constitutional
provision changes over time naturally-this is said to "explain
how the Constitution has survived without amendments. 294
Constitutional transformation occurs when a constitutional
provision has lost its effectiveness but has been replaced by a new
meaning.295 While it can certainly be argued that Article 9 has lost
its effectiveness, it is not clear that the original intent has been
wholly replaced by a new meaning.296 If indeed popular opinion
286 Lim, supra note 245.
287 See Lower House Passes Extension of Anti-Terrorism Law, supra note 230.
288 See Southgate, supra note 187, at 1620.
289 See id. at 1631-32.
290 Id. at 1633.
291 "The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of the SDF." Fisher,
supra note 20, at 413.
292 That is to say, such theories could allow one to avoid the conclusion that Japan
no longer follows the rule of law. See Port, supra note 13, at 150.
293 Id. at 150. This theory has been described as "the key to Japan's ability ... to
assimilate an alien constitutional system with such equanimity." Id. at 151.
294 Fisher, supra note 20, at 414.
295 Id.
296 See id.
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has fully endorsed the meaning argued by the executive, then why
does the Supreme Court refuse to "deliver a direct opinion
recognizing the constitutionality of the SDF"?2 97 As Japan scholar
Kenneth Port points out, even if constitutional transformation is
truly in effect, this still does not satisfy an inquiry into whether or
not Japan follows the rule of law.2 98
The supremacy of international law is a different theory used
to explain how the SDF can be considered constitutional.
Although the Constitution of Japan declares itself the supreme law
of the land,299 it also explicitly states that "treaties concluded by
Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully
observed., 30 0 Professor Port argues that "the Constitution appears
to make itself subject to international law."' ' One treaty to which
Japan is a party is the United Nations Charter, which directly
points to an inherent right of self-defense.30 2 However, if Article 9
truly does deny Japan the right to self-defense, as was originally
taught in Japanese schools after the war,30 3  the possible
constitutional conflict between Article 9 and the self-defense
recognized by the United Nations Charter has not yet been subject
to judicial deliberation."
The argument used most often by Japanese leaders to support
the constitutionality of the SDF is a linguistic one based on the
obfuscation of the Ashida amendments to Article 9.305 While
297 Id.
298 See Port, supra note 13, at 151.
299 KENPO, art. 98.
300 KENPO, art. 98 § 2.
301 See Port, supra note 13, at 152.
302 Id. at 151. The 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty also implicitly recognizes
Japan's right to self-defense, in that it recognizes Japan's increasing responsibility for its
own defense, in addition to relying on the United States. See Security Treaty Between
the United States of America and Japan, U.S.-Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329.
303 See Auer, supra note 4, at 176.
304 Some commentators, however, have argued that United Nations rules of force
themselves are no longer in effect, given that two-thirds of the member nations have
engaged armed conflicts since the founding of the organization. See Timothy Kearley,
Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search
for Original Intent, 3 Wyo. L. REv. 663, 672-73 (2003).
305 For a more detailed analysis of subtle changes in the Japanese text which served
to soften the impact of Article 9, see Port, supra note 13, at 152-57.
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Article 9 states that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained," it does so only "[i]n order to
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph., 30 6 The aim of the
preceding paragraph is to "renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes" in an effort to "[aspire] sincerely to an
international peace."30 7 Therefore, Article 9 could be read to mean
that military forces are only disallowed for the purposes of making
war and using force in international disputes. Such a reading
allows for the interpretation that Article 9 does not prohibit a
military force that should only be used in the self-defense of the
nation. 38 Even if this legal analysis of Article 9 is sound, it still
does not explain the use of the SDF in collective action in foreign
countries such as that authorized by the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law.30 9
D. Legislative and Popular Support for Reform
Espousing legal arguments to justify the constitutionality of
the SDF is clearly not enough fro most Japanese legislators. This
is reflected in a recent poll showing that over 80 percent of
currently elected legislators in the House of Representatives,
irrespective of political party, are in favor of revising the Japanese
Constitution.310 A different poll shows that 56 percent of Japanese
are in favor of constitutional reform-a rise of 9 percent since
1997.311 Approximately the same percentage of respondents felt
that a constitutional amendment should "clearly allow for the
existence of the SDF."'3 12 Perhaps most importantly, new Prime
Minister Abe is wholly dedicated to constitutional reform.313 It
306 KENPO, art. 9 § 2.
307 KENPO, art. 9.
308 See Sakata, reprinted in COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60, supra note 256, at 303-04.
309 See Southgate, supra note 187, at 1620.
310 See Poll Winners Keen on Postal, Top Law Reform, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Sept. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14470950.
311 56% Support Revisions to Constitution, ASAHI (Tokyo), May 3, 2005, available
at LexisNexis Academic.
312 Id.
313 See Nakata, supra note 76. Abe has stated that he would "like to draft a new
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appears that, on the whole, Japan remains unconvinced that Article
9 can be satisfactorily interpreted in its current form to allow for
the SDF.
IV. Constitutional Reform
Japan could make the first constitutional amendments in the
nation's history. The general procedure for amendments is laid
out in Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution.314 Article 96 states
that amendment requires two-thirds agreement in each house of
the legislature, followed by a majority popular vote by Japanese
citizens.315 Before this can happen, however, legislators will have
to develop specific procedures for initiation of a constitutional
revision in the Diet and for popular referendum.31 6 Steps towards
the development of these procedures are already underway.3"7
Despite these requirements, it would appear that Japan has an
easier task of amending its constitution than that required of some
other countries, such as the United States.3 18
In spite of the relative ease of amending the Japanese
Constitution, prior attempts to amend it have resulted in utter
failure. The closest revisionists ever came to amending Article 9
was in 1956 when a proposed amendment went to vote in the Diet
but "failed to obtain the two-thirds voting majority necessary."'3 19
In 1957, the Commission on the Constitution was established with
the goal of investigating constitutional problems and preparing a
draft amendment.3 20 However, upon the release of the final report
Constitution with [his] own hands." Onishi, supra note 72. . In fact, Abe expects to
enact a revised Constitution within the next five years, a task he envisions taking place
within his term as Prime Minister. See Abe Seeking to Amend Top Law Within His Term,
DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Nov. 2, 2006, available at LEXIS; Hiroko Nakata, Abe
Figures Five Years Needed for Constitutional Revisions, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Sept. 12,
2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060912a2.html
(registration required to access the article).
314 KENPO, art. 96.
315 KENPO, art. 96.
316 See Diet to Move Ahead on Top Law Reform, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Oct. 3,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15844250.
317 See id.
318 See Hoften, supra note 188, at 303-04.
319 Sato, supra note 47, at 98.
320 See id.
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in 1964, the Commission failed to present a consolidated view
either for or against constitutional amendment.3 2' Since then, the
LDP's dream of revision of Article 9 has essentially remained on
the back-burner in terms of political agenda,3 22 though that appears
to be changing rapidly.3
23
V. The LDP's Reform Proposal
The current LDP draft proposal for constitutional reform
probably stands the best chance yet of actually becoming a
constitutional amendment. As mentioned previously, there is
widespread support for amendment in general, with 80 percent of
at least one house of the Diet3 24 and 56 percent of the Japanese
public approving. 325 But support for constitutional amendment in
general does not necessarily translate directly into votes for one
particular amendment proposal, particularly in a multi-party
political system like Japan's. While it is difficult to say exactly
how the LDP's draft will be received, one indicator has been the
level of general public support for recent LDP administrations.
Riding high on his snap election victory, Koizumi did very
well in the polls immediately afterwards.326 A 2005 poll showed
62 percent popular support for Koizumi following the election, an
increase of over 14 percent from the month prior.3 27 Fifty-nine
percent of Japanese polled indicated that they felt the Koizumi
administration was leading Japan "in the right direction. '3 2' This
level of support cannot be attributed to Koizumi's charisma
alone-polls also showed that 61 percent indicated overall
321 See id.
322 See id. at 99-100.
323 See Keizo Nabeshima, Op-Ed, Toward a New Constitution, JAPAN TIMES
(Tokyo), Oct. 17, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo2005
1017kn.html (describing recent cross-party movements towards consensus on
constitutional amendment) (registration required to access the article).
324 Poll Winners Keen on Postal, Top Law Reform, supra note 310.
325 56% Support Revisions to Constitution, supra note 311.
326 See Koizumi's Popularity Back Over 60%, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 21,
2005, available at LEXIS.
327 Id.
328 59% Believe Japan's Politics on Right Track, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 28,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15299235.
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approval of Koizumi's executive cabinet.329
Despite the LDP's wealth of public support, due to the
requirement that an amendment receive two-thirds vote in both
houses of the Diet, "[c]onstitutional amendments could not be
proposed without the support of the [Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ)]," the leading opposition party.33 ° Together, the two parties
account for over 80 percent of each house of the Diet.33' While the
former leader of the DPJ, Maehara, had a decidedly pro-
amendment stance, the DPJ is unlikely to agree with the LDP on
every matter.332 The DPJ has a more limited concept of the SDF,
arguing for a "'restricted right of self-defense' for the nation under
the U.N. charter," with pacifism explicitly remaining "the guiding
principle for Japan. 3 33  Furthermore, Maehara has argued that
there should be constitutional guarantees that "war is
renounced.., and [Japan's] forces will never be used overseas. 334
Unlike the DPJ, the LDP argues for a much more expansive
definition of the SDF and Japan's right of self-defense in their new
proposal.335 Indeed, the new draft officially renames the SDF and
explicitly refers to the maintenance of a "self-defense military.
'
"336
This change is of particular interest because it would mark the first
time since the end of WWII that Japan has referred to its own
329 Poll: Support for Cabinet Edges Up, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Nov. 15, 2005,
available at LEXIS.
330 Nabeshima, supra note 323.
331 See id.
332 See id. In 2006, Maehara was replaced by Ichiro Ozawa, a figure not friendly to
the LDP. See Masami Ito, DPJ Approves New Leadership as Ozawa Vows to Unseat
LDP, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.
co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060412a5.html (registration required to access the article).
333 DPJ Approves New Leadership as Ozawa Vows to Unseat LDP, supra note 332.
334 Koizumi Wants Legal Basis for Military, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 31, 2005,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20051031al.html (registration
required to access the article).
335 In addition to seeking an expanded military, the LDP also adds additional rights
in their new draft constitution, such as the right to a clean environment. See Self-Defense
Right Guaranteed by Draft, supra note 17. In an apparent attempt to respond to judicial
criticism of Koizumi's Yasukuni visits, the draft also "implicitly allows government
officials to support religious activities within the bounds of social courtesy, manners[,]
and customs[.]" Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, supra note 6.
336 Self-Defense Right Guaranteed by Draft, supra note 17.
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armed forces as a military.337 Koizumi explained the change,
stating that though Japan will "never wage a war[, the
constitution] should clearly state a possession of troops for self-
defense so they're not misunderstood as unconstitutional." '338 In
other words, the LDP aims to resolve the decades old debate about
whether or not the SDF is unconstitutional by clearly stating in the
new constitution that the force is not only within the law, but is
now a constitutional requirement.
In order to achieve these aims, the new LDP draft first has re-
titled the second chapter "from 'Renunciation of War' to 'National
Security.' ' 339 While the first paragraph has remained untouched,
the second paragraph has been "drastically re-written. ' 3 4°  The
existing language of the second paragraph, stating that "'land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained' and '[t]he right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized"' has been removed altogether.341 In its place, the draft
uses the aforementioned language referring to the maintenance of
a self-defense military.3 42  Finally, the "draft allows for the
exercise of all rights of self-defense, including forming military
alliances with other countries and deploying [military forces]
overseas while engaging in 'international cooperation activities for
the purpose of securing international peace.' 343
The new draft also undertakes substantial changes which some
have referred to as "conservative" and "nationalistic[,]" to the
preamble. 3" Presumably in response to criticism of the current
constitution's foreign-influenced origin, the preamble begins by
definitively stating that the "Japanese people, based on their own
will and determination, establish a new Constitution. 3 41 Similarly
to the current constitution, albeit much more succinctly, the new
337 See Auer, supra note 4, at 176-77.
338 Freire, supra note 2.
339 Self-Defense Right Guaranteed by Draft, supra note 17.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 See LDP Preamble Sets Nationalistic Tone, ASAHI (Tokyo), Oct. 7, 2005,
available at LexisNexis Academic.
345 Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, supra note 6.
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draft states that "[b]asic principles-the idea of popular
sovereignty, democracy, liberalism, respect for basic human
rights, pacifism[,] and the idea of international harmony-shall be
inherited as inalterable values. 346 The new preamble also says
"[s]incerely wishing for international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people will cooperate with other nations to
realize it. While recognizing the existence of a variety of values in
the international community, the people will make incessant
efforts to eliminate oppression and the violation of human
rights."347
In a move that some say undermines the principle of pacifism
and ignores the lessons of Japan's past, the new draft preamble
removes the post-war language "'never again shall we be visited
with the horrors of war through the action of government., 3 48
Furthermore, the new preamble states that "[t]he Japanese people
share a duty to support and defend the nation and society they
belong to with love, a sense of responsibility[,] and mettle. 349
The reference to the love of the nation reminds some of language
used in Japan's nationalistic past.35 °
In short, these changes allow Japan to follow the lead of the
United Kingdom and Australia through active participation with
the United States and the United Nations in various international
military and peace-keeping endeavors. As Koizumi indicated, this
is in response to a "need to take up the challenges of strife and
conflict that may face international society over the next [fifty]
years."35' At the same time, the new draft seems like an attempted
representation of a modem Japan which is finally ready to toss off
the remaining vestiges of post-war culpability and guilt and enter
the arena of international cooperation unhampered. Keenly aware
of the equivalent temporal gaps between the Meiji Restoration, the
end of WWII, and the introduction of this new draft, Koizumi
referred to his party's proposal as Japan's third "miracle"
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 See LDP Preamble Sets Nationalistic Tone, supra note 344.
351 See Carl Freire, Japan Considers Military Change, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER
(Charlotte, NC), Nov. 23, 2005, at 6A.
(Vol. XXXII
REFORMING JAPAN'S PACIFIST CONSTITUTION
reform.352
VI. Analysis and Recommendations
Arguments of constitutionality aside, it is clear that Japan's
current armed forces are in opposition to the original intent of
Article 9. Japan largely appears to recognize this fact, as
evidenced by the overwhelming legislative support and growing
popular support for constitutional reform. In response to this
conflict, Japanese lawmakers have three options. First, the current
uneasy balance can be maintained. Second, the SDF can be
abolished or severely restricted. Third, the constitution can be
reformed to clearly allow for a military force. The LDP is
currently proposing the last option.
The first alternative-to maintain the status quo-is an
increasingly unfavorable option. The status quo option is
apparently more and more distasteful to Japanese lawmakers.353
This is evident from the fact that all of the largest Japanese
political parties support constitutional reform, though they
disagree on the degree of change.354 Making no change is
incompatible with several current trends in Japan, including the
continued growth of the SDF, the United States' demands for a
more independent military, and Japan's desire to participate in
international humanitarian and collective defense operations. In
short, the chasm between the original intent of Article 9 and the
modem SDF continues to widen and Japan is finally coming to the
realization that this divergence needs to be addressed directly.
The second alternative of adhering to Article 9's original intent
is an entirely impractical option. Doing so would involve the most
effort of the three possible solutions, because it would require
dismantling or severely limiting the SDF. Despite such
drawbacks, there are some who advocate transforming the SDF
from a quasi-military force to a simple disaster relief
organization.355 While the change may draw applause from
pacifists in Japan and most of Japan's East Asian neighbors, such
352 See 'Miracle' Reforms Now the LDP's Main Mission, supra note 167.
353 See Poll Winners Keen on Postal, Top Law Reform, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
supra note 310.
354 See Nabeshima, supra note 323.
355 See Port, supra note 13, at 160.
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a drastic shift would entail serious risks as well. It is clear that the
cooperative military defensive relationship between Japan and the
United States is based on a strategy of deterrence for unchecked
military growth in Asia.356 Statements from the United States
pushing for an increasingly capable Japanese armed forces
357
suggest that the United States would not be willing to return to the
non-mutual defensive relationship that followed WWII. 38 Any
major shift in the relationship would likely exacerbate the already
volatile military tensions in the region. An insufficiently defended
Japan could become a vulnerable target for aggression from
abroad.
In this analysis, it is important to remember Shidehara's
original argument for an absolute Article 9359-a truly pacifistic
Japan could serve as an ideal for the rest of the world. But "Japan
does not exist in a vacuum[,] ,360 and it would be a mistake to look
at Japan's post-war success in isolation. Instead, it should be
considered in the context of the defensive support provided by the
United States, support that the United States is gradually
withdrawing in the expectation that Japan will provide more for its
own defense.36' While dissolving the SDF would adhere to the
admirable principles originally enshrined in Article 9, it may well
be that such a resolution would prove untenable.
In the end, the third option-amending the constitution to
allow for a full-fledged military force, may be the best option.
Although constitutional reform was once thought to be virtually
356 See Interim Report Stresses Defense Cooperation Between Japan, U.S., supra
note 244.
357 See Konishi, supra note 236.
358 Japan is certainly aware of its heavy reliance on the United States and the
importance of that strategy in terms of its overall international diplomatic strategy. See
Editorial, Tightening the Knot, ASAHI (Tokyo), Nov. 18, 2005, available at LexisNexis
Academic.
359 See Takayanagi, supra note 184, at 86.
360 Fisher, supra note 20, at 430.
361 "Japan will either become a 'normal' ally or risk being set free to look after
itself. Normal alliances are willing to fight if necessary." Robyn Lim, Editorial, Missile
Defense Will Define Japan-U.S. Security Alliance, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 14, 2005,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20051014rl.html (registration
required to access the article).
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unattainable,362 it now appears to be a possibility.363 In addition to
the concerns mentioned above, the surge in Japanese nationalism
may also lend support to the classic criticism that Japan's current
constitution sounds like a "poor translation." 364 One of the most
vocal critics of the linguistic qualities of the constitution has been
Yukio Mishima, novelist, playwright, and literary master of
modem Japan.365
Mishima was acutely aware of the intrusion of foreign
influence into classic Japanese written language, and in his
exploration of the issue he used the phrase hon'yaku bun, or
"language resulting from the act of translation[.] ' '366 According to
Mishima, the constitution is a particularly egregious example of
hon'yaku bun; he stated that it is "a truly monstrous, hideous
prose, and not a few people must have felt the sorrow of the
Occupied at the fact that it became the Japanese Constitution. 367
Perhaps it was because of this sorrow that the constitution was
never subjected to popular referendum at its introduction, and so it
has remained to this day.368
It is easy to sympathize with a nation desiring a constitution
clearly derived from its own language, as opposed to one where
"any ... [reader] can perceive its foreign origin., 369 It is also easy
362 "The chance of passing such an amendment.., is... extremely unlikely."
Fisher, supra note 20, at 427.
363 See 56% Support Revisions to Constitution, supra note 311.
364 See Constitutional Revision: The LDP Apparently Put Off Debate On Article 9,
supra note 48.
365 Regarded during his lifetime as a candidate for a Nobel Prize for literature,
Mishima ended his life after several decades of phenomenal success by committing ritual
self-disembowelment, known as seppuku, after failing to incite SDF troops to revolt. See
Mishima Still Intriguing 35 Years After His Death, ASAHI (Tokyo), Nov. 28, 2005 (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
In regards to his own interpretation of Article 9, Mishima said "[tihe Self-Defense
Forces are obviously unconstitutional[.]" Hiroaki Sato, Editorial, Constitutional Debate
Welcome, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Sept. 26, 2005, available at http://search.
japantimes.co.jp/print/eo2005O926hs.html (registration required to access the article).
366 Sato, supra note 365.
367 Id.
368 "[T]he Japanese Government did not want to go to its people for a referendum
on the new Constitution." Hamano, supra note 3, at 440.
369 Early criticism of the LDP draft has called it "unexpectedly bland ... [having
been] watered down in the hope that it would be more acceptable" to the major political
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to sympathize with a national desire for a popular referendum on
the constitution that is meant to represent them. When considering
these issues in conjunction with the resolution that a constitutional
amendment could bring to the constitutional conflict surrounding
the SDF, a new constitution emerges as the best solution.
Additionally, the introduction of the new LDP draft comes
sixty years after the end of WWII. Japan has experienced drastic
positive changes since that time, transforming from a recipient of
international aid to one of the world's largest donors.37 ° It could
be argued that Japan's post-war limitations should now be
removed, allowing Japan to take its place unfettered among the
ranks of powerful, educated, and law-abiding nations of the world
striving for a unified peace through expression of mutual self-
interests.
Japan has essentially already made this argument, albeit in a
different context, in its bid to become a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council. 371 As the world's second largest
economy, 372 Japan contributes more than the aggregate of all other
permanent Security Council members, save the United States. 373
Japan's bid for a permanent seat, which was combined with
similar efforts from Brazil, Germany, and India, was ultimately
unsuccessful, but it can be seen as another example of Japan's
efforts to finally break the mold set in place for it at the end of
WWII.
3 7 4
parties. Constitutional Revision: The LDP Apparently Put Off Debate on Article 9,
supra note 48.
370 See Wolfowitz, supra note 10.
371 Osamu Kawakami, Govt Seeks Fairer Deal on U.N. Dues/Contribution Larger
Than Total of All UNSC Permanent Members, Except U.S., DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Sept. 12, 2005, available at 2005 WL 14352013.
372 See Cortazzi, supra note 27.
373 "The current contributions as a proportion of the total U.N. budget of the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are 22 percent for the United States,
6.13 percent for Britain, 6.03 percent for France, 2.05 percent for China[,] and 1.1
percent for Russia. Japan contributes 19.47 of the total U.N. budget[.]" Kawakami,
supra note 371. Nevertheless, as a part of its Security Council seat bid, Japan gave 45
billion yen in aid to devastated Pacific nations in 2006. See Japan Aids Pacific Nations,
Wins Support for UNSC, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), May 28, 2006, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20060528a1.html (registration required to access
the article).
374 Japan's efforts were also not without criticism, particularly from China. See
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Despite the benefits of a constitutional amendment that
explicitly allows a military force, evaluation of such a remedy
should not exclude consideration of the larger political context,
particularly that of East Asian diplomatic relationships. The
relationship between Japan and its closest neighbors is rapidly
deteriorating and unsurprisingly Japan's neighbors would not look
favorably on such an amendment.375 In fact, introducing such a
drastic change "at a time when East Asia faces potential crises
such as North Korea's nuclear-weapons development and a
military clash between China and Taiwan 37 6 could prove
disastrous for Japan.
For these reasons, any amendment process to the Japanese
Constitution to explicitly allow a military would be greatly
enhanced by including several important qualifications. First, as
suggested by former DPJ President Maehara, the amendment
could stipulate that Japan only has the right to exercise collective
defense in a limited way.377 As the Japanese realized at the
drafting of the original Article 9, self-defense can easily be used as
a justification for initiation of war.378 The risk is particularly great
where a self-defense force has the right to conduct collective
defense operations on the high seas and foreign soil. Accordingly,
in order to help allay the concerns of the previous victims of
Japanese aggression, any amendment should make clear that the
military force is explicitly for national self-defense and
international humanitarian aid purposes. The constitution should
also state that it will only allow international operations that have
been authorized by the United Nations.
Second, the drafters of constitutional amendment should
Opinion, Japan Needs Qualification: Commentary, PEOPLE'S DAILY (Beijing), Sept. 26,
2004, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200409/26/eng20040926_158
336.html. "The [U.N.] Charter does not regulate in its clauses that its permanent
Security Council membership is decided by the amount of a country's donation to the
world body. . . . [The U.N.] is neither a club for the rich nor a board of directors
organized by its shareholders." Id.
375 See Japan Should Wake Up to History, supra note 52.
376 Editorial, Caution Needed in Defense Relations, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Nov. 1,
2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed2005 1101 al.html (registration
required to access the article).
377 See Koizumi Wants Legal Basis for Military, supra note 334.
378 See Port, supra note 13, at 143.
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
include a specific acknowledgment of responsibility and apology
for Japan's past military transgressions and a sincere statement of
commitment to avoiding such errors in the future. Ideally, both
concepts should be included in the new preamble and revised
Article 9 itself. It is a mistake for Japan to think that time alone
has "settled [Japan's] wartime account."37 9  Rather, the new
constitution could be an ideal opportunity to passionately and
unambiguously make clear that Japan remembers the war and
accepts responsibility for it, that Japan apologizes for its actions
during that time, that these new changes are only directed at an
effort towards international peace, and that Japan forever
renounces the military aggression of its imperialist past.
Third, along with efforts to amend the constitution, the
Japanese government would greatly further its cause by
concurrently making efforts to resolve the international tension
surrounding the Yasukuni shrine and history textbook issues.
While having the appropriately conciliatory language in the new
constitution is critical, "Tokyo must [also] back [its] words with
,,180actions. Particularly if Japan seeks to remove the war
renunciation language that many abroad see as Japan's greatest
existing statement of war apology,38 Japan ought not at the same
time continue to ignore the already "high and rising international
price" of actions which undermine the sincerity of its war
apologies.382
The Japanese government could accomplish this by
undertaking two actions. First, it could develop a secular war
memorial to act as a permanent replacement to official visits to the
Yasukuni shrine or follow other suggestions to defuse the
Yasukuni issue. This would allow Japanese politicians to maintain
a respectable posture with the Japanese public by continuing to
pay respects to the war dead. At the same time it would appease
the international community, which is outraged by continual acts
of reverence for convicted Japanese war criminals. Second, the
Japanese government could establish a commission to investigate
the historical accuracy and honesty of the contents of history
379 Japan Should Wake Up to History, supra note 52.
380 Xiao, supra note 58.
381 See Yoshitake, supra note 78.
382 Glosserman, supra note 84.
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textbooks in Japanese schools. If Japan refuses to correct the
information in textbooks that tends to downplay Japan's war
responsibility it sends the message to the international community
that Japan does not desire subsequent generations to be fully aware
of the extent of their nation's past culpability.
A positive relationship between Japan and its Asian neighbors
is preferable for all parties.383 While a revamped constitution that
once again allows for the existence of a Japanese military will
certainly create ripples abroad, a domestic paradigm shift to "face
history squarely and honestly" could help alleviate those
tensions.384 Otherwise, the constitutional amendment would only
exacerbate an already deteriorating situation.
Unfortunately, the LDP's current efforts towards amendment
follow virtually none of the aforementioned recommendations.
While the draft does state that the military will be for self-defense
purposes, those purposes are all but explicitly unlimited by the
surrounding language.385 Current Prime Minister Abe has made
clear that he supports a Japanese right of collective self-defense386
as well as a general expansion of Japan's defense capability.387
The fact that the self-defense military could operate overseas and
form alliances with any country of its choosing is unlikely to do
anything but confirm the fears of the previous victims of Japanese
aggression. Additionally, while the draft preamble does include
the principle of pacifism as an inalienable right, at the same time it
removes compelling language from the existing constitution about
Japan's steadfast determination to avoid war at all costs in the
future.388 Indeed, the draft preamble and Article 9 appear to
"bur[y] lessons from Japan's modern war. 3 89  In its place is
383 See Opinion, Japan Must Face Up to History, PEOPLE'S DAILY (Beijing), May
13, 2004, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200405/13/eng20040513
_143145.html.
384 Id.
385 See Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, supra note 6; Constitutional
Revision: The LDP Apparently Put Off Debate on Article 9, supra note 48.
386 See Abe Eager to Push Debate Over Right to Collective Self-Defense, ASAHI
(Tokyo), Sept. 6, 2006.
387 See Yoshida, supra note 101.
388 See Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, supra note 6.
389 Id.
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language that appears instead to rally Japan around the flag-
sentiments sure to incite apprehensions abroad.3 90
Finally, the Japanese government does not appear to be taking
any steps towards resolving the Yasukuni or history textbook
issues. In fact, the government appears to be all but ignoring the
problem. When United States President George Bush recently
asked Koizumi about China, "Koizumi said: 'Japan-China
relations have become stronger in various areas,' as if to imply
there is no cause for concern., 391  Furthermore, commentators
have suggested that the language in the draft that allows
government officials' support of religious activities was
specifically written to remove any domestic legal hurdles for
future Yasukuni visits by public officials.392 There appears to be
little progress investigating an alternative, secular memorial.3 93
With successor Prime Minister Abe suggesting that he would
continue to visit Yasukuni, the problem is only going to get
worse.3 94 The same can be said about the textbook problem, since
the most glaringly offensive books are only increasing in
circulation, and this success is having a "ripple effect" with other
publishers who have started toning down their descriptions of
wartime atrocities as well.395
VII.Conclusion
Although the Japanese judiciary appears unwilling to address
the issue the Japanese government has made many assurances to
the contrary, the modern SDF simply cannot comport with the
pacifist notions present in the Constitution of Japan. This implicit
limitation is apparently clear to the Japanese legislature,
considering the large numbers of the body who either wish to
390 Id.
391 Tightening the Knot, supra note 358.
392 See Draft Revision Tosses Principles Aside, supra note 6.
393 It has been suggested that the main reason for this is that Koizumi "loathes being
told what to do." See Koizumi's Scorn Further Delays Study of New War Memorial,
ASAHI (Tokyo), Dec. 24, 2005 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation).
394 See Koizumi Reshuffles Cabinet/3 Possible Successors-Abe, Aso, Tanigaki-
Get Key Posts, supra note 102.
395 See Nakamura, supra note 127.
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severely limit the SDF or modify the constitution to allow for a
transformation into an official military force. It now appears
possible that amendment proponents will be able to dilute the draft
language in order to satisfy enough political parties to actually
arrive, for the first time since its inception, at a popular
referendum on a new Japanese constitution.
On the one hand, this gives the Japanese people a wonderful
opportunity to work together to create a constitution that is entirely
their own. On the other hand, the LDP's current direction will
ultimately work against critical diplomatic relationships with
Japan's closest neighbors. Although Japan's desire to step beyond
the shadow of its dark wartime past is certainly understandable, in
the interests of international peace and prosperity, Japan would do
well to openly and humbly shoulder the responsibility of its own
history. If it does not do this, but instead continues down the path
of ardent nationalism, any amendment to the Constitution of Japan
that removes the war renunciation clause could potentially enflame
regional tensions. Not only would Japan's own national security
interests be at stake, but regional and even world peace could hang
in the balance. In order to avoid a potentially tragic outcome,
Japan should do the right thing and swallow its pride. Only then
can the large-scale national reforms that are currently sweeping
Japan avoid further destabilizing an already volatile region.
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